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YOU CAN CHECK OUT BUT YOU CAN 
NEVER LEAVE: THE STORY OF SAN REMO 
HOTEL—THE SUPREME COURT 
RELEGATES FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAIMS 
TO STATE COURTS UNDER A RULE 
INTENDED TO RIPEN THE CLAIMS FOR 
FEDERAL REVIEW 
J. David Breemer*
Abstract: On June 20, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States is-
sued its decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, holding 
that property owners with “takings” claims arising under the Fifth 
Amendment could not obtain federal review after litigating in state 
court in compliance with the ripeness requirements of Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank. The case presented the 
speciªc question of whether federal takings claimants could invoke an 
exception to claim and issue preclusion doctrines under England v. Lou-
isiana State Board of Medical Examiners because Williamson County forced 
them to involuntarily litigate in state court. This Article reviews the San 
Remo decision, criticizing the majority’s narrow interpretation of Eng-
land and the result in banishing takings claims to state courts. The Arti-
cle then explores the Williamson County ripeness requirement, and con-
demns the majority’s decision for failing to explicitly address Williamson 
County’s ºaws. Finally, the Article considers whether San Remo closes the 
federal courthouse door to takings claims seeking noncompensatory re-
lief. 
Introduction 
 On June 20, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States issued 
its decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco (San Remo IV ), 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Attorney, Paciªc Legal Foundation. J.D., University of Hawaii, 2001; M.A., Uni-
versity of California, Davis, 1994; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1990. I 
would like to thank R.S. Radford, Eric Grant, and James Burling for their thoughts during 
the drafting of this Article. This Article is dedicated to Michael M. Berger, in honor of his 
tireless efforts to bring the problems with Williamson County’s ripeness doctrine to the at-
tention of courts and commentators. Thanks Michael. 
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a case involving the right of private property owners to seek just com-
pensation in federal court for violations of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.1 The case seemed to require the Court to return to 
the ripeness requirements of Williamson County Regional Planning Com-
mission v. Hamilton Bank to determine whether they interacted with is-
sue preclusion to strip federal takings claimants of a federal forum for 
their complaint.2 In Williamson County, the Court held that federal tak-
ings claims were unripe until the claimant unsuccessfully sought com-
pensation in state court,3 indicating that federal review was available 
upon satisfaction of this ripeness hurdle.4 Unfortunately, Williamson 
County neglected to explain how compliance with the state procedures 
requirement would affect traditional jurisdictional doctrines,5 such as 
                                                                                                                      
1 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (2005). 
2 See 473 U.S. 172, 186–97 (1985). 
3 Id. at 194. There is voluminous commentary on Williamson County’s state compensa-
tion procedures requirement. See, e.g., Stephen E. Abraham, Williamson County Fifteen 
Years Later: When Is a Takings Claim (Ever) Ripe?, 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 101, 104 
(2001); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-parody Stage, 
36 Urb. Law. 671, 673 (2004); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse 
in Regulatory Takings, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 99, 102 (2000); J. David Breemer, Overcoming 
Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How The England Reservation, Issue Pre-
clusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings 
Claims, 18 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 209, 210 (2003); John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, 
Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the 
Federal Courthouse, 31 Urb. Law. 195, 246 (1999); Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine 
and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1, 22–
24 (1992); Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over Federal 
Property Rights Legislation, 27 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 5 (1999) (“The U.S. Supreme Court 
has developed rules that make it almost impossible for federal courts to remedy violations 
of the Just Compensation Clause by local land-use agencies.”); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting 
the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid 
Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26 Ecology L.Q. 1, 2 (1999); Madeline J. Meacham, 
The Williamson Trap, 32 Urb. Law. 239, 239 (2000); Thomas E. Roberts, Procedural Implica-
tions of Williamson County/First English in Regulatory Takings Litigation: Reservations, Re-
moval, Diversity, Supplemental Jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman, and Res Judicata, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,353 [hereinafter Roberts, Procedural Impliciations]; Thomas E. 
Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. Land Use & 
Envtl. L. 37, 37 (1995) [hereinafter Roberts, Ripeness]. 
4 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–97; see DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 518 n.3 
(6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Williamson County “clearly contemplates that a takings plaintiff 
who loses her claim in state court will have a day in federal court”). 
5 Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 
1998) (“Williamson . . . does not discuss res judicata and collateral estoppel”). 
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claim and issue preclusion,6 that generally bar federal courts from 
hearing previously litigated cases.7
 Confronted with a ripeness rule that seemed to trigger both fed-
eral review under Williamson County and application of preclusion un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Act,8 federal courts struggled to identify 
the circumstances in which they could hear federal takings claims.9 
Without guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, many lower 
courts concluded that the preclusion doctrines prevailed.10 This pro-
duced a counter-response in which many courts held that takings 
plaintiffs could insulate themselves from claim preclusion by expressly 
reserving their federal takings claims for federal review under England 
                                                                                                                      
6 See generally San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). Under claim preclusion, or “res judi-
cata, a ªnal judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Id. at 2500 n.16 
(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Under issue preclusion, or “collateral 
estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that 
decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action in-
volving a party to the ªrst case.” Id. 
7 Williamson County’s state procedures requirement also triggers jurisdictional prob-
lems under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as well as under preclusion doctrine. See id. at 
2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co. and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, two cases in which “state-court 
losers [brought federal actions] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
. . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005). In both cases, the Su-
preme Court held that the district courts lacked jurisdiction “[b]ecause . . . authority to 
review a state court’s judgment [vests] solely in [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 1526. Prior to 
Exxon, some courts had held that takings claims ripened by state court litigation in compli-
ance with Williamson County were precluded from federal courts under Rooker-Feldman. See 
Henry v. Jefferson County Planning Comm’n, 34 F. App’x 92, 96 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). 
8 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). For a general dis-
cussion of the effects of the state procedures requirement and the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, see Berger, supra note 3, at 105–09; Breemer, supra note 3, at 240–
44, 251–53; Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal Court: The State 
Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 Urb. Law. 479, 500–01 (1992). 
9 See DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 521–22 (discussing “various ways” in which federal courts 
have wrestled with the Williamson County preclusion problem). 
10 See Berger, supra note 3, at 102 (“When property owners follow Williamson County 
and ªrst sue in state court, they are met in some federal circuits with the argument that 
the state court litigation, far from ripening the federal cause of action, instead has extin-
guished it.”); Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“The district-court route [for liti-
gating a takings claim] may prove fruitless . . . because litigation of the taking claim there 
ordinarily will be barred by the doctrines of issue or claim preclusion . . . .”); Kovaks, supra 
note 3 at 18 (“The combination of Williamson County and § 1738 [mandating application of 
the doctrines of preclusion], therefore, effectively precludes adjudication of federal tak-
ings claims in federal court.”). 
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v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.11 Nevertheless, in con-
junction with issue preclusion principles, Williamson County ultimately 
generated a strange doctrine that lured takings claimants into state 
courts with the promise of federal review, only to permanently banish 
them from federal courts at the moment of ripeness.12
 No case better illustrates the pernicious nature of the state proce-
dures-preclusion problem than San Remo IV. 13 San Remo did every-
thing it could to secure federal jurisdiction consistent with Williamson 
County: it unsuccessfully sought just compensation in California state 
court under a state law takings claim, explicitly reserved its federal tak-
ings claims for federal review under England,14 and did not litigate any 
federal issues in state court.15 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that San Remo’s ripened claims could not be heard in 
federal court because the claims were barred by issue preclusion.16 
                                                                                                                      
11 375 U.S. 411, 420–22 (1964); see DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 521–22. See generally infra 
notes 50–64 and accompanying text. 
12 See DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 519–21. 
 The availability of federal courts to hear federal constitutional takings 
claims has often seemed illusory, because under Williamson County takings 
plaintiffs must ªrst ªle in state court . . . before ªling a federal claim, and be-
cause in deciding that federal claim, preclusive effect must be given to that 
prior state-court action under [the Full Faith and Credit Act] . . . . The bar-
ring of the federal courthouse door to takings litigants seems an unantici-
pated effect of Williamson County, and one which is unique to the takings con-
text, as other § 1983 plaintiffs do not have the requirement of ªling prior 
state-court actions . . . . 
Id. 
For commentary criticizing the preclusive effect of the state procedures requirement, 
see Berger, supra note 3, at 102 (“In Williamson County . . . the Court expanded on the doc-
trine of ripeness in regulatory taking cases transforming the ripeness doctrine from a mi-
nor anomaly into a procedural monster.”); Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 3, at 5 (“The 
U.S. Supreme Court has developed rules that make it almost impossible for federal courts 
to remedy violations of the Just Compensation Clause by local land-use agencies.”); Greg-
ory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal 
Land Use Litigation, 20 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 17, 27 (1997) (state procedures require-
ment has “dramatic” and “absurd” application); Roberts, Ripeness, supra note 3, at 71 (de-
scribing Williamson County’s state procedures requirement as a “fraud or hoax on landown-
ers.”). 
13 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
14 Id. 
15 San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco (San Remo II), 41 P.3d 87, 91 n.1 (Cal. 
2002) (“Plaintiffs sought no relief in state court for violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. They explicitly reserved their federal causes of action. As 
their petition for writ of mandate, as well, rests solely on state law, no federal question has 
been presented or decided in this case.”). 
16 San Remo III, 364 F.3d at 1098–99. 
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Rather than maturing its claims for federal review, San Remo’s dutiful 
compliance with Williamson County had precluded any federal claim.17
 The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in San Remo IV seemed 
destined to clarify the long-standing controversy over the nature of Wil-
liamson County’s state procedural ripeness requirement and the ability 
of takings claimants to reserve federal takings claims under England. 18 
Ultimately, the majority decision in San Remo IV strictly applied preclu-
sion,19 refused to apply England in the takings context,20 and approv-
ingly concluded that San Remo’s federal just compensation claims 
could never be heard in federal court.21 But the Court failed to pay any 
meaningful attention to the Williamson County requirement that put 
San Remo in this position.22
 This Article reviews the preclusion and Williamson County issues 
raised by the Supreme Court’s decision, and its consequences for fed-
eral takings claimants. Part I reviews the evolution of Williamson 
County’s state procedures rule, speciªcally exploring the claim and issue 
preclusion problems it engendered, and the lower courts’ attempt to 
ªnd a compromise solution in England. Part II summarizes the San 
Remo litigation, ending with the opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Part III critiques the majority’s refusal to grant a preclusion exception 
to takings claimants in San Remo’s position. Part IV criticizes the ma-
jority’s treatment of Williamson County’s state procedures requirement. 
This section argues that San Remo IV’s result in permanently thrusting 
many takings claimants into state court rests entirely on Williamson 
County’s doctrinally unsupportable ripeness rules. It then questions the 
majority’s refusal to address Williamson County and the concurrences’ 
objections to the state procedures rule. Finally, Part IV argues that, 
while San Remo IV and Williamson County may close the federal court-
house door to many takings claimants, the door remains slightly ajar for 
some types of claims. The Article concludes that the Court should over-
                                                                                                                      
17 See id. at 1096. 
18 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2504–06 (2005). Prior to taking the San Remo IV 
case, the Supreme Court had been buffeted by a series of certiorari petitions seeking 
clariªcation of Williamson County. See, e.g., Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003); Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & 
Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 178 F.3d 1295 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 
(1999); Dodd II, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923 (1998); Macri v. 
King County, 126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998). 
19 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2504–06. 
20 Id. at 2502–04. 
21 Id. at 2506–07. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 202–06. 
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turn Williamson County’s state procedures requirement or Congress 
should loosen the Full Faith and Credit Act to allow all federal takings 
claims to be heard in federal court. 
I. The Setting: Preclusion Doctrine Stiºes Williamson 
County’s State Procedures Requirement and Triggers  
a Backlash in the Federal Courts 
 In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 
the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review a single ques-
tion: whether a landowner denied the right to complete an approved 
subdivision was entitled to damages for a temporary regulatory tak-
ing.23 This issue was, however, never reached by the Court. Instead, the 
Williamson County opinion was concerned only with the procedural 
question of whether the takings claim was ripe for review.24 The Court 
held that it was not, positing two reasons.25 First, the Court held the 
claim was premature because the planning commission had not made a 
ªnal decision on the bank’s development proposal.26 The Court 
stressed that no claim was “ripe until the government entity charged 
with implementing the regulations has reached a ªnal decision regard-
ing the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”27
                                                                                                                      
23 Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 181–82 
(1985). 
24 Id. at 199–200. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 186. 
27 Id. The ªnal decision concerning the ripeness rule arose from the fact that courts 
cannot determine whether the application of land use regulations to a claimant’s property 
“goes too far” and causes a taking without a concrete idea of what the government has 
prohibited. Id. at 190–91, 199. The Court explained: 
 We need not pass upon the merits of petitioners’ arguments, for even if 
viewed as a question of due process, respondent’s claim is premature. Viewing 
a regulation that “goes too far” as an invalid exercise of the police power, 
rather than as a “taking” for which just compensation must be paid, does not 
resolve the difªcult problem of how to deªne “too far,” that is, how to distin-
guish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same 
effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physi-
cal possession. As we have noted, resolution of that question depends, in 
signiªcant part, upon an analysis of the effect the Commission’s application 
of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the value of re-
spondent’s property and investment-backed proªt expectations. That effect 
cannot be measured until a ªnal decision is made as to how the regulations 
will be applied to respondent’s property. 
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 The Court then articulated and applied a second, more novel 
ripeness rule.28 Reasoning from the premise that there is no violation 
of the Just Compensation Clause until the property owner is denied 
just compensation, and therefore that a “State’s action . . . is not 
‘complete’ until the State fails to provide adequate compensation,”29 
the Court ruled that if a State provides an adequate procedure for 
seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a viola-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the state pro-
cedure and been denied just compensation.30 Applying this principle, 
the Court held that the bank’s takings claim was “premature” and 
“not yet ripe” for federal review until the Bank sought compensation 
through Tennessee’s inverse condemnation procedures.31
 At this moment, the San Remo IV dispute became inevitable. To 
understand why, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the state pro-
cedures requirement in the federal courts, and particularly, the courts’ 
struggle to reconcile the rule’s ripeness purpose with the law of claim 
and issue preclusion. 
A. Claim Preclusion, the State Procedures Requirement,  
and the Reservation Exception 
 The state procedures rule seemed relatively simple in the immedi-
ate aftermath of Williamson County: federal takings claimants had to 
raise and lose their just compensation claims in state courts to ripen 
their federal claims, but once they did, their claims were mature for 
review in federal court.32 However, it quickly became apparent that this 
simple view was inconsistent with—and might not survive—traditional 
applications of the Full Faith and Credit Act.33
 The Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts to give state 
court judgments the same effect given to those judgments by the state 
from which they arise.34 This means that, “a federal court must give to 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 199–200. For sharp criticism of the ªnal decision aspect of Williamson County, see 
Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent 
in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 Urb. Law. 307, 328–30 (1998). 
28 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. 
29 Id. at 195. 
30 Id. at 194–95. 
31 Id. at 194–97. 
32 See id. 
33 See DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2004). 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Full Faith and Credit Act provides in pertinent part: 
“Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the 
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and 
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a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given 
that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 
rendered.”35 In short, federal courts are statutorily bound to apply a 
state’s law of issue preclusion and claim preclusion when confronted 
with cases previously litigated in state courts.36
 Claim preclusion—known as res judicata—is a doctrine that “bars 
future litigation of claims that were brought or could have been 
brought in a prior proceeding that resulted in a ªnal judgment on 
the merits.”37 Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is different from 
claim preclusion because it bars litigation of any factual or legal issues 
resolved in a prior proceeding, without respect to whether the claims 
from which the issues arise were previously litigated.38
 On their face, claim and issue preclusion are in tension with Wil-
liamson County’s ripeness purposes because, when preclusion controls, 
prior litigation totally bars subsequent litigation; failed state court liti-
gation does not ready takings claims for federal review, but simply 
leaves them dead. This outcome is in tension with the apparent intent 
of Williamson County.39 Nevertheless, as the following section illus-
                                                                                                                      
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession 
from which they are taken.” Id. 
35 Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). 
36 See id. at 80–85. 
37 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southhampton, 220 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
38 See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Collateral estoppel may preclude the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated in 
a previous action, even if the claim in which the issue arises in the subsequent action was 
not brought and could not have been brought in the previous action whose judgment 
gives rise to the estoppel.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) (“When 
an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and ªnal judgment, 
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a 
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”). 
39 See Berger, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the state procedures rule as applied by 
lower courts as “bizarre” and not “what the Williamson County court intended because it is 
inherently nonsensical and self-stultifying”); Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use Be Differ-
ent? Reºections on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v. Hamilton Bank, in Tak-
ings Sides on Takings Issues, (Roberts, ed., ABA 2002) 471 (“No issue has bedeviled 
takings law more than ripeness—that is, when is it suitable to bring such a claim in federal 
court”); Roberts, Ripeness, supra note 3, at 71 (“One understandable reaction to the prong 
two [state compensation procedures] requirement . . . is that it perpetrates a fraud or hoax 
on landowners. The courts say: ‘Your suit is not ripe until you seek compensation from the 
state courts,’” but when the landowner does these things, the court says: Ha ha, now it is 
too late.). 
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trates, early federal decisions favored a strict application of preclusion 
doctrine,40 effectively barring ripe takings claims from federal court.41
1. Claim Preclusion Trumps Ripeness 
 In a 1992 decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals aptly 
summarized and addressed the claim preclusion problem confronting 
federal takings plaintiffs and the courts following Williamson County: 
On the one hand, Williamson County requires potential fed-
eral court plaintiffs to pursue any available state court reme-
dies that might lead to just compensation . . . . On the other 
hand, if a litigant brings a takings claim under the relevant 
state procedure, he runs the risk of being barred from re-
turning to federal court; most state courts recognize res ju-
dicata and collateral estoppel doctrines that would require a 
state court litigant to raise his federal constitutional claims 
with the state claims, on pain of merger and bar of such fed-
eral claims in any attempted future proceeding. Thus, when 
a would-be federal court litigant ventures to state court to 
exhaust any potential avenues of obtaining compensation, in 
order to establish that a taking “without just compensation” 
has actually occurred as required by Williamson County, he 
ªnds himself forced to raise the federal law takings claim 
even though he would prefer to reserve the federal claim for 
resolution in a section 1983 suit brought in federal court.42
                                                                                                                      
40 See Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364–65 
(9th Cir. 1993); Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 727–29 (3d Cir. 1989); Rainey 
Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 178 F.3d 1295 (6th Cir. 
1999) aff’g 967 F. Supp. 998, 1003–06 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). 
41 See Kovacs, supra note 3, at 2 (Williamson County’s state procedures rule, “in combi-
nation with preclusion doctrines . . . effectively bars plaintiffs from raising federal takings 
claims in federal court”). 
42 Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1992). One 
leading commentator put it more derisively: 
When property owners follow Williamson County and ªrst sue in state court, 
they are met in some federal circuits with the argument that the state court 
litigation, far from ripening the federal cause of action, instead has extinguished 
it. Under these [federal] courts’ reasoning, the state proceedings are res judi-
cata, and thus bar the pursuit of the now-ripened federal action. Thus, the 
very act of ripening a case also ends it. 
• Berger, supra note 3, at 102. 
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The ultimate result of enforcing preclusion was that federal takings 
claimants were relegated, against their will, to the state courts.43
 Although some courts recognized that rigidly applying preclusion 
to prevent ripe takings claims from being heard in federal court was 
“difªcult to reconcile [with] the ripeness requirement of William-
son,”44 most courts initially refused to recognize any exceptions to 
preclusion for ripened takings claims.45 This trend reached its zenith 
in the 1998 case of Wilkinson v. Pitkin County.46 In Wilkinson, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals sympathized with takings claimants trying to 
sue in federal court after they had engaged in the state court litiga-
tion required by Williamson County, but nevertheless refused to con-
clude that compliance with Williamson County operated as an excep-
tion to preclusion: 
 We conclude the Williamson ripeness requirement is in-
sufªcient to preclude application of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel principles in this case. As in [another case], the 
facts set forth in the state court actions are the same facts 
necessary for a determination of the federal claims. Also, . . . 
plaintiffs asserted federal claims in the state court proceed-
ings, which were fully adjudicated, (or they could have done 
so), and the Colorado rules against claim splitting required 
them to do so.47
 Thus, Wilkinson and similar cases established that—under normal 
circumstances—federal claims litigated in state court in accordance 
with Williamson County would be barred from federal court by claim 
preclusion.48 These early decisions also recognized the tension between 
this strict application of claim preclusion and the ripeness purposes of 
Williamson County. Plaintiffs and courts looking for a way to reconcile 
preclusion with Williamson County’s apparent intent to allow takings 
                                                                                                                      
43 Berger, supra note 3, at 102. 
44 Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1325 n.4; see Fields, 953 F.2d at 1302–03. 
45 Peduto, 878 F.2d at 728–29 (rejecting argument that it was “wrong that the procedure 
outlined in Williamson and New Jersey’s [claim preclusion rules] . . . should deny them a 
federal forum where they may present their federal claims.”); Rainey Bros Constr. Co., 967 F. 
Supp. at 1004 (“the interaction between Williamson County and the Full Faith and Credit 
Act [preclusion rules] requires that a plaintiff landowner assert his federal claims in the 
state courts.”). 
46 See 142 F.3d at 1324–25. 
47 Id. at 1324–25 (citation omitted). 
48 See id.; Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 362 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
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claims in federal court soon identiªed a possible compromise in Eng-
land v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.49
2. The “England Reservation” Solution 
 In England, the Supreme Court appeared to establish a method 
allowing federal litigants with constitutional claims to avoid preclusion 
when compelled to litigate in state court against their will.50 The case 
arose when the State of Louisiana refused to issue would-be chiroprac-
tors a license to practice, since they had not fulªlled the educational 
prerequisites required to practice medicine.51 The chiropractors sued 
in federal district court, claiming that the denial of their application 
violated due process.52 Deciding that the claims could be resolved un-
der state law depending on whether the state license law properly ap-
plied to the chiropractors, the district court invoked the abstention 
doctrine, directing the plaintiffs to go to state court to deªnitively re-
solve the state law issue.53
 In state court, the chiropractors argued both the state law issues 
and their federal due process claims.54 They did so to comply with a 
prior Supreme Court decision, Government & Civic Employees Organiz-
ing Committee v. Windsor,55 which seemed to declare that a state court 
litigant must raise all claims, including federal constitutional claims.56 
When the state courts held that the statute was properly applied to the 
chiropractors without violating due process, the chiropractors reas-
serted their due process claims in federal district court.57 Applying 
preclusion principles, the district court held that the claims were 
barred because the chiropractors had raised them in the prior state 
court proceedings.58
 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.59 The Court expressed 
concerns that an unwilling state court litigant would be barred from a 
preferred federal forum, but recognized that some state court litigants 
might be deemed to “forgo [the] right to return to the District Court” 
                                                                                                                      
49 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
50 Id. at 421. 
51 Id. at 412–13. 
52 Id. at 413. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 413–14. 
55 353 U.S. 364 (1957). 
56 England, 375 U.S. at 420. 
57 Id. at 414. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 423. 
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by “freely and without reservation submit[ting] his federal claims for 
decision by the state courts.”60 But this basis for preclusion was prob-
lematic because Windsor was understood to mean that state court liti-
gants must raise related constitutional claims.61 If so, then some state 
court litigants who did not consent to state adjudication of constitu-
tional claims could nevertheless be deemed to have so consented and 
to have waived their right to district court review out of an effort to 
comply with Windsor. 62
 To resolve this dilemma, the Court in England clariªed that Win-
dsor did not require a state court litigant to actually put the claims be-
fore the court; it meant only that a party “must inform those courts 
what his federal claims are, so that the state statute may be construed 
‘in light of’ those claims.”63 Therefore, “mere compliance with Windsor 
will not support a conclusion, much less create a presumption, that a 
litigant has freely and without reservation litigated his federal claims in 
the state courts and so elected not to return to the District Court.”64
 However, recognizing that there was still room for confusion, the 
Court further held that an involuntary state court plaintiff could abso-
lutely preserve federal review by making an express, on the record, 
reservation of any federal claims for resolution in federal court: 
That is, [the plaintiff] may inform the state courts that he is 
exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose of 
complying with Windsor, and that he intends, should the state 
courts hold against him on the question of state law, to return 
to the District Court for disposition of his federal conten-
tions. . . . When the reservation has been made . . . his right to 
return will in all events be preserved.65
3. Federal Courts Extend England to Takings Claims 
 Although a few early post-Williamson County courts recognized Eng-
land as a potential method for takings claimants to avoid claim preclu-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s 1992 decision in Fields v. 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. at 419. 
61 See id. at 420. 
62 England, 375 U.S. at 414–15. 
63 Id. at 420 (citing Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
1358, 1364–65 (1960)). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 421–22. 
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Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority was the ªrst appellate decision to 
thoroughly analyze and accept the technique.66
 In Fields, the question presented was “whether the district court 
erred in concluding that Florida collateral estoppel and res judicata 
principles precluded the federal courts from hearing the homeown-
ers’ federal law takings claim” after state courts had previously re-
jected the owner’s state law takings claim.67 In other words, the court 
intended to “decide whether the interplay of England and Williamson 
County creates an exception to the operation of [claim preclusion].”68 
The Eleventh Circuit was not fully convinced that the England reserva-
tion was applicable in the takings context, because “the England proc-
ess” was technically pertinent to claims that could be ªled ªrst in fed-
eral court.69 Nevertheless, the court concluded that England could be 
legitimately extended to claims that were ªled initially in state court, 
provided that the state action was involuntary.70
 Applying this conclusion in light of Williamson County’s state litiga-
tion rule, the Fields court held “that would-be federal court litigants 
who are forced to pursue state court proceedings in order to satisfy ex-
haustion requirements imposed by federal law incident to a takings 
clause claim are ‘involuntarily’ in the state courts, and therefore qualify 
for the [England-type] exception to generally applicable res judicata 
principles.”71 Property owners forced by Williamson County to ªle tak-
ings claims in state court could avoid claim preclusion in the federal 
courts by making a “reservation of their federal constitutional claims on 
the record.”72
 Over the next decade, federal courts got in line with Fields in view-
ing the England reservation as an exception to the application of claim 
                                                                                                                      
66 953 F.2d 1299, 1309 n.10 (11th Cir. 1992). 
67 Id. at 1302. The court had previously decided in Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Boar, 
a non-takings case, that a litigant may reserve federal claims for federal review by expressly 
reserving the federal claims from the state court litigation, the Fields court declared that 
“[t]he application of Jennings to the present dispute provides the central issue in this ap-
peal.” Id. at 1303. 
68 Id. at 1304. 
69 Id. at 1305. 
70 Id. at 1305–06. For support, the Fields court relied on a footnote in Migra v. Warren 
City School District Board of Education—which involved claims originally raised in state 
court—implying that England applied “when a litigant with a federal constitutional claim is 
involuntarily in state court.” Id. at 1306 (citing Migra, 465 U.S. 75, 85 n.7 (1984)). 
71 Id. at 1306. 
72 Fields, 953 F.2d at 1309 n.10. Because the plaintiffs in Fields had not made a reserva-
tion to state court resolution of their federal takings claims when ªling in state court, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied Florida claim preclusion to dismiss their federal takings claim. Id. 
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preclusion to ripened federal takings claims.73 Although a few decisions 
concluded that England was inapplicable to takings claims because, un-
like the claims in England, takings claims could not be raised in federal 
court in the ªrst instance,74 the vast majority followed Fields in conclud-
ing that the crux of England was whether the state court litigant was in-
voluntarily in state court; if so, the England reservation was available.75 
Therefore, takings claimants could reserve their federal claims for fed-
eral review—avoiding claim preclusion in federal court—because Wil-
liamson County gave them no choice but to ªle in state court.76
                                                                                                                      
73 See, e.g., San Remo III, 364 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The City does not dis-
pute that the plaintiffs’ England reservation was sufªcient to avoid the doctrine of claim 
preclusion.”); DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (adopting England 
reservation to avoid claim preclusion); Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 
F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the “state court’s judgment on the state-law 
claim would not have preclusive effect in the subsequent federal action.”); Saboff v. St. 
John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 200 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
reservation applies); Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front 
Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting an England reservation). In rejecting 
the argument that England was only applicable to state court litigants who were in state 
court by prior abstention at the federal level, the Sixth Circuit explained the fundamental 
basis for the court’s unwillingness to adopt a crabbed view of England: “extension of Eng-
land to unwilling state court litigants is necessary to avoid grave unfairness.” DLX, Inc., 381 
F.3d at 523 n.9. But see 17A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Proce-
dure § 4243 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 2005)) (“The England procedure strictly speaking is 
applicable only if a case was begun in federal court . . . .”). 
74 Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A]s plaintiffs 
here invoked the jurisdiction of the state court in the ªrst instance, the application of Eng-
land has no relevance here . . . .”); Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 312 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (“In order to make an England reservation, a litigant must establish its right to 
have its federal claims adjudicated in a federal forum by properly invoking the jurisdiction 
of the federal court in the ªrst instance.”); see also Ganz v. City of Belvedere, 739 F. 
Supp. 507, 509 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (explaining that plaintiff could retain federal jurisdiction 
of section 1983 takings claims by ªling ªrst in federal court, securing abstention, raising 
state claims in state court and making an England reservation). For further discussion of 
this argument, see DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 531 (Baldock, J., concurring). 
75 See supra notes 67–74. 
76 Santini, 342 F.3d at 130. 
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 By 2005, a clear majority of the circuits77 and many state courts78 
had recognized that federal takings claimants could use the England 
reservation approach. Other circuits expressed a favorable view of es-
caping claim preclusion under England.79 However, few of these courts 
paused to consider whether the England reservation would effect appli-
cation of issue preclusion. The courts were soon compelled to confront 
this question and the possibility that, when limited to claim preclusion, 
the England approach had no practical effect on federal jurisdiction 
over takings claims. 
B. Issue Preclusion: The Final Barrier Between Federal Takings  
Claims and Federal Court 
 The doctrine of issue preclusion presents an independent barrier 
to federal review of ripe takings cases because it bars relitigation of 
any factual or legal issues decided in a prior proceeding, regardless of 
whether claim preclusion applies.80 Issue preclusion may bar review of 
a case that involves issues already considered even though the case 
raises claims entirely different from those raised in a prior proceed-
ing. Therefore, issue preclusion could bar a federal takings case in-
volving issues raised in a prior, Williamson County-mandated state court 
proceeding, even if the federal takings claims were reserved under 
England and never raised in state court: 
 The requirement of Williamson County that a property 
owner must pursue compensation through available state 
procedures, such as a state-law inverse condemnation action, 
                                                                                                                      
77 See DLX, Inc., 381 F.3d at 521–22 (“[N]o court has held that where a plaintiff re-
serves its federal claims in an England reservation . . . and does not litigate them in the 
state courts, that claim preclusion will operate to bar a federal-court action.”). 
78 Hallco Texas, Inc. v. McMullen County, 94 SW.3d 735, 739 (2002). The court stated 
that: 
[a] claimant may reserve his federal claims for litigation in federal court by 
following a three-step procedure: (1) the litigant ªrst ªles in federal court; 
(2) the federal court abstains and stays the federal proceedings until the state 
courts resolve all state-law questions; and (3) the litigant informs the state 
courts of his intention to return, if necessary, to federal court on his federal 
constitutional questions after the state-court proceedings are concluded. 
• Id. 
79 See Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The 
suggestion [that an England reservation avoids claim preclusion] has the virtue of logic 
and is tempting.”); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 
820–23 (3d Cir. 1994). 
80 See Santini, 342 F.3d at 127; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). 
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before bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim has created 
a Catch-22 for takings plaintiffs. Under Williamson County, a 
plaintiff may not bring a Fifth Amendment takings claim 
without ªrst having unsuccessfully pursued a state-law takings 
claim. Under traditional notions of collateral estoppel, how-
ever, the state court’s adverse judgment will often preclude 
the plaintiff’s subsequent Fifth Amendment takings claim.81
Thus, as with the claim preclusion controversy, courts had to deter-
mine whether issue preclusion would be allowed to trump the intent 
of Williamson County’s state procedures rule and whether England was 
available as an exception. 
1. The Dodd Paradigm: Issues Litigated in a State Law Action Bar 
(Almost) All Federal Takings Issues 
 In Dodd v. Hood River County (Dodd I), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals established that issue preclusion could bar even a ripe federal 
takings claim that had been properly reserved for federal review dur-
ing state law takings litigation.82 The Dodds raised and lost state law 
takings claims in Oregon state court, expressly reserving their federal 
takings claim for federal review.83 The district court dismissed their 
attempt to reassert the claims in federal court.84 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the England reservation protected the Dodds’ 
complaint from claim preclusion.85 However, the court recognized a 
potential, additional issue preclusion barrier,86 remanding the case to 
the district court for a determination of whether the prior state law 
takings judgment “was an equivalent determination under the federal 
taking clause so as to invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion.”87
 When the case returned to the Ninth Circuit, the court more ex-
plicitly applied issue preclusion against the Dodds’ claims.88 The 
court ªrst rejected the argument that the England reservation immu-
nized the Dodds’ complaint from issue preclusion, holding that the 
                                                                                                                      
81 Santini, 342 F.3d at 127. 
82 See Dodd v. Hood River County (Dodd II), 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998); Dodd 
v. Hood River County (Dodd I), 59 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 1995). 
83 Dodd I, 59 F.3d at 856–57. 
84 Id. at 857. 
85 Id. at 862. 
86 Id. at 863. 
87 Id. 
88 Dodd II, 136 F.3d at 1224–28. 
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reservation only avoided claim preclusion.89 Issue preclusion there-
fore applied and operated to bar the Dodds from litigating any legal 
or factual aspect of their federal takings claim that had already been 
considered as part of the state court litigation.90 However, because 
Oregon takings law did not include diminished “investment-backed 
expectations” as a regulatory takings test, the state courts could not 
have actually decided that issue.91 On this basis, the court concluded 
that the Dodds could litigate their investment-backed expectations 
theory in federal court.92
 Thus, in refusing to allow an exception to issue preclusion for tak-
ings claims ripened by state court litigation required by Williamson County, 
Dodd II closed the window for takings claims in federal courts, leaving only 
a small crack for those instances in which state takings law fails to incor-
porate a federal standard.93 In so doing, Dodd II increased the tension 
between preclusion doctrine and Williamson County’s apparent intent to 
allow takings claims in federal court after the required state court litiga-
tion.94 This conºict weighed on the federal courts95 and commentators.96 
In 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals broke ranks.97
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. at 1227. The court elaborated as follows: 
Nor does the Dodds’ previous reservation of this federal takings claim under 
the doctrine of England . . . prevent operation of the issue preclusion doc-
trine. Because the Dodds were effectively able to reserve their claim for fed-
eral court, . . . the reservation doctrine does not enable them to avoid preclu-
sion of issues actually litigated . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). Applying issue preclusion, the court barred the portion of the 
Dodds’ federal claim that rested on an alleged denial of all economic use of their property, 
holding that a sufªciently identical issue was considered and rejected by the Oregon 
courts. Id. at 1225–26. 
90 See id. at 1225–28. 
91 See id. at 1228–29. 
92 Id. at 1228–29. Ending the Dodds’ fourteen year odyssey through state and federal 
courts, the Ninth Circuit resolved the investment-backed expectations in the County’s 
favor. Id. at 1230. 
93 For discussion of the extent to which the Dodd II approach would allow takings 
claimants to escape issue preclusion and decisions recognizing a distinction between state 
and federal law that might bring a claimant within Dodd II’s narrow window for avoiding 
preclusion, see Breemer, supra note 3, at 253–57 and accompanying footnotes. 
94 See Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 687. 
95 Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“We do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Williamson County to deprive all 
property owners in states whose takings jurisprudence generally follows federal law (i.e., 
those to whom collateral estoppel would apply) of the opportunity to bring Fifth Amend-
ment takings claims in federal court.”); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of County 
Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1325 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (“It is difªcult to reconcile the ripeness 
requirement of Williamson with the laws of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”). 
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2. Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service: The 
Second Circuit Rejects Dodd I 
 In Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Dodd I’s approach to the issue 
preclusion problem.98 The Connecticut Waste Management Service 
(the Service) secretly considered Santini’s land as a site for a nuclear 
waste dump.99 When the Service selected Santini’s property as a poten-
tial site and made this decision public, Santini sued in Connecticut 
state courts, alleging that the Service had committed a temporary regu-
latory taking by destroying his ability to develop, market, and sell previ-
ously developable land.100
 No federal takings claims were litigated in the state proceeding.101 
When the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected Santini’s state takings 
claims, Santini sued in federal district court, this time raising takings 
claims under the U.S. Constitution.102 The Service opposed the court’s 
jurisdiction largely on claim and issue preclusion grounds.103 Santini 
argued that “the unique procedural posture of post-Williamson County 
takings claims requires . . . exceptions to the preclusion doctrines.”104
 The Second Circuit acknowledged that under an “ordinary” appli-
cation of issue preclusion, Santini’s federal takings claims would be 
barred due to the actual litigation of state takings issues in state 
                                                                                                                      
96 See, e.g., Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 687–90 (decrying application of preclu-
sion to ripe takings claims as “a diabolical trap”); Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 3, at 201 
(stating that due to preclusion, “the Takings Clause remains a ‘poor relation’ to other 
protections in the Bill of Rights”); Kanner, supra note 27, at 332–33 (asserting that the 
intersection of Williamson County and preclusion shows “constitutional rights of landowners 
as not quite deserving of a full measure of judicial protection, on par with other constitu-
tional rights.”). 
A few isolated commentators found nothing awry in the “Williamson Trap.” See 
Meacham, supra note 3, at 257 (“Until and unless . . . just compensation has been denied 
because a property owner has been denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate her tak-
ings claim in state court, a plaintiff’s choice of federal court can and should be properly 
denied . . . .”). 
97 See Santini, 342 F.3d at 126–30. 
98 Id. at 127–28. 
99 Id. at 122. 
100 Id. at 122–23. 
101 Id. at 126–27. Under Connecticut law, the federal claims could not be raised in state 
court until after the state law claims failed. Id. 
102 Id. at 124. 
103 Santini, 342 F.3d at 126. 
104 Id. 
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court.105 But the court refused to engage in a rigid application of issue 
preclusion because: 
It would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that 
the Supreme Court required Santini to follow before bring-
ing a Fifth Amendment takings claim—a state-court inverse 
condemnation action—also precluded Santini from ever 
bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim. We do not be-
lieve that the Supreme Court intended in Williamson County 
to deprive all property owners in states whose takings juris-
prudence generally follows federal law (i.e., those to whom 
collateral estoppel would apply) of the opportunity to bring 
Fifth Amendment takings claims in federal court.106
 Resolving to “part ways with most of our sister circuits,”107 the 
Santini court held that an England-type reservation would insulate ripe 
takings claims from both claim and issue preclusion.108 This effort 
created a direct conºict with Dodd, which would reemerge in the case 
of San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco.109
II. The Story of the San Remo Hotel 
A. San Remo IV’s Factual and Procedural History 
 At its core, the San Remo Hotel is a tale of a federal takings claim-
ant who litigated for twelve years in state and federal forums in an ef-
fort to ripen the claim for a federal court—in accordance with the di-
rections of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals—but eventually found out that the directions 
were nothing but a cruel joke, sending the hotel in the exact opposite 
direction it wanted to go.110 Instead of guiding the hotel to federal 
court, the ripeness directions in Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank banished the hotel to state court.111
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. at 126–27. The Second Circuit concluded that claim preclusion was inapplicable 
“because Santini neither brought, nor could have brought, a Fifth Amendment takings 
claim in the Connecticut state court action . . . .” Id. at 127. 
106 Id. at 130. 
107 Id. at 128. 
108 Id. at 130. 
109 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2500–07 (2005). 
110 See San Remo III, 364 F.3d 1088, 1091–94 (9th Cir. 2004). 
111 See id. at 1096. 
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 The case began when the hotel sought to convert low cost residen-
tial units to tourist use pursuant to the City’s Hotel Conversion Ordi-
nance (HCO).112 The City agreed to grant a conversion permit, but 
only if the hotel ªrst paid $567,000.113 Believing this requirement was 
“‘an out-and-out plan of extortion,’” prohibited by Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,114 the hotel’s owners sued the City in federal court, 
claiming that the fee requirements of the HCO effected an unconstitu-
tional taking of their property, both facially and as-applied.115 When the 
initial litigation reached the Ninth Circuit, the court found San Remo’s 
as-applied takings claim not ripe because the hotel had not sought just 
compensation in California courts as required by Williamson County.116 
On the facial claims, the court invoked abstention, staying all federal 
proceedings until San Remo litigated its state law claims—including a 
claim that the HCO did not apply to the hotel—in state courts.117
 The hotel then ªled a complaint in state court carefully reserving 
its federal claims under England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers for later review by the district court.118 The case appealed to 
the Supreme Court of California which held that under state law, the 
heightened scrutiny for exactions evident in Nollan and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard 119 did not apply to the monetary exaction imposed on San 
Remo.120 Applying a more deferential standard, the court rejected 
San Remo’s state law takings claims.121 However, the majority, concur-
ring and dissenting justices stressed that San Remo had reserved its 
federal takings claims for federal review, had not raised such claims in 
state court, and that no state court had ever addressed those claims.122
 San Remo then attempted to return to federal court to litigate its 
unresolved federal takings claims, asserting that the Constitution of 
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. at 1092. 
113 See San Remo II, 41 P.3d 87, 95 (Cal. 2002). 
114 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 
(N.H. 1981)). 
115 San Remo III, 364 F.3d at 1096–97. The hotel owner’s takings claim relied heavily on 
Nollan. See id. 
116 San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco (San Remo I ), 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
117 Id. at 1104–05. 
118 See 375 U.S. 411 (1964); San Remo II, 41 P.3d at 91. 
119 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
120 See San Remo II, 41 P.3d at 100–06 (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987)). 
121 Id. at 106–11. 
122 Id. at 91 n.1; id. at 118 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); see id. at 128 (Brown, 
J., dissenting). 
2006] The San Remo Hotel Decision 267 
the United States required a more exacting level of scrutiny than Cali-
fornia law.123 The district court, however, held that the prior state 
court litigation barred renewed federal litigation under the doctrine 
of issue preclusion.124 The Ninth Circuit afªrmed, concluding that 
San Remo’s England reservation did not protect it from issue preclu-
sion and refusing to follow Santini in recognizing a general exception 
to preclusion for takings claimants forced into state court by William-
son County.125 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted San 
Remo’s petition for certiorari on the following question: “whether ‘a 
Fifth Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based 
on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which 
was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen 
the federal Takings Claim?’”126
B. The Supreme Court Banishes Federal Just Compensation  
Claims to State Courts 
 In an opinion issued on June 20, 2005, the Supreme Court 
unanimously afªrmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s application 
of issue preclusion against San Remo’s claims, refusing to recognize an 
exception—under England or otherwise—that would allow the claims 
in federal court after the failed state court litigation.127 In so doing, the 
majority neglected to explicitly consider the Williamson County rule driv-
ing the preclusion problem, even while its opinion appeared to implic-
itly endorse that requirement.128 However, four concurring justices 
roundly criticized Williamson County and its effect in relegating com-
pensation claims to state courts, while agreeing that San Remo’s com-
pliance with Williamson County triggered preclusion and therefore 
barred its claims.129
                                                                                                                      
123 See San Remo III, 364 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004). 
124 Id. at 1094. 
125 Id. at 1095–96. 
126 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 n.1 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari at *i, San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005) (No. 04-340)). 
127 Id. at 2491, 2500–07. 
128 Id. at 2506. 
129 See id. at 2507–10 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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1. The Majority Opinion Part I: Just Compensation Claimants Cannot 
Invoke the England Reservation 
 According to the majority, San Remo IV presented only the “nar-
row” question of whether the Court should create an exception to the 
Full Faith and Credit Act, “in order to provide a federal forum for liti-
gants who seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe un-
til the entry of a ªnal state judgment denying just compensation.”130 
Addressing England, the majority held that a state court plaintiff could 
invoke the England reservation to preserve federal review only when 
the plaintiff (1) ªrst properly invokes federal jurisdiction over a fed-
eral claim, and (2) the “federal court abstains from deciding [the] 
federal . . . issue to enable the state courts to address an antecedent 
state-law issue” that “may moot the federal controversy.”131
 The Court explained that the England reservation was not meant 
to give state courts “an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is func-
tionally identical to the federal question” sought to be reserved.132 
The reservation is available where there exists a constitutional attack 
on “a state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the 
statute in a particular manner.”133 In short, the federal issues must be 
“distinct” from the state law issues sent to state court.134
 Based on this understanding, San Remo was theoretically entitled 
to invoke the England reservation only with respect to its facial takings 
claims.135 According to the Court, the reservation was possible for the 
facial claims because those claims were properly ªled in federal court 
and that court had abstained on the claims to allow a state court de-
termination on the issue of the scope of the HCO, which had “the 
potential of mooting [the] facial challenge” by “overturning the City’s 
original classiªciation of the . . . Hotel as a ‘residential’ property [sub-
ject to the HCO].”136 Nevertheless, the Court held that San Remo had 
                                                                                                                      
130 Id. at 2501 (majority opinion). More particularly, given the argument presented to 
the Court by plaintiffs, the issue for resolution was whether federal courts could exercise 
de novo review over federal takings claims “whenever plaintiffs reserve their claims under 
England,” during the course of prior state court litigation, or otherwise, “regardless of what 
issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided them.” Id. 
131 Id. at 2502. 
132 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2502. 
133 Id. (citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 420 (1964)). 
134 Id.; see also id. at 2506 (“Petitioners did not have the right . . . to seek state review of 
the same substantive issues they sought to reserve. The purpose of the England reservation 
is not to grant plaintiffs a second bite at the apple in their forum of choice.”). 
135 Id. at 2503. 
136 Id. 
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effectively waived the reservation for its facial claims by broadening its 
state law action to include the merits of its facial takings claims.137 Be-
cause San Remo “effectively asked the state court to resolve the same 
federal [takings] issues they asked it to reserve,”138 the England reser-
vation could not protect the facial claims from preclusion.139 As for 
San Remo’s as-applied claims, the majority held that the England res-
ervation was never available to preserve federal review because those 
claims were unripe and therefore “never properly before the District 
Court” in the ªrst place.140
2. Part II: Just Compensation Claimants Have No Right to A Federal 
Forum 
 Turning from England, the majority considered San Remo’s more 
general contention that the Court should recognize a preclusion ex-
ception to effectuate Williamson County’s intent to permit takings 
claims in federal court following compliance with the state proce-
dures requirement.141 The majority rejected this argument as im-
properly assuming “a right to vindicate . . . federal claims in a federal 
forum” free from preclusion.142 The majority scolded: “issues actually 
decided in valid state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of 
the ‘right’ to have their federal claims relitigated in federal court.”143
 As a second reason for rejecting San Remo’s request that the Court 
create a preclusion exception to effectuate the ripeness promises of 
Williamson County, the majority asserted that it had no power to articu-
late exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit Act.144 The power resided 
in Congress: “Even when the plaintiff’s resort to state court is involun-
tary and the federal interest in denying ªnality is robust, we have held 
                                                                                                                      
137 Id. 
138 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2503. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2504. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. The majority relied heavily on Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Id. at 2504–
05. The majority read Allen’s application of the Full Faith and Credit Act to close off a fed-
eral forum even when the would-be federal “plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate 
in state court, but was required to do so by statute or prudential rules.” Id. at 2504. In ap-
plying this principle against San Remo, the majority dismissed the distinction that, unlike 
in Allen, San Remo had attempted to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction as an initial 
matter. Id. at 2505. The Court found this attempt of no relevant signiªcance for applica-
tion of Allen because San Remo’s as-applied claims were not ripe when it sought jurisdic-
tion. Id. 
144 Id. at 2505. 
270 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:247 
that Congress ‘“must ‘clearly manifest” its intent to depart from [the 
Full Faith and Credit Act].’”145 Finding that “Congress has not ex-
pressed any intent to exempt from the full faith and credit statute fed-
eral takings claims,” the majority concluded it could not, and would 
not, craft its own exception.146
 Finally, the majority criticized San Remo’s plea for a preclusion 
exception as overstating “the reach of Williamson County.”147 San 
Remo was wrong in contending that Williamson County forced all its 
federal claims into a state court proceeding that would trigger preclu-
sion; San Remo’s facial takings claims were ripe from the start and, 
therefore, could have been raised directly in federal court.148 San 
Remo also erred in suggesting that Williamson County might be con-
strued to require prior state law takings proceedings to ripen a federal 
claim in state court, and so combine with preclusion to bar federal 
claims from both federal and state court.149 The majority held that 
state courts could “simultaneously [hear] a plaintiff’s request for 
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, 
the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.”150
 The majority did recognize that its strict construction of preclu-
sion would mean “a signiªcant number of plaintiffs will necessarily 
litigate their federal takings claims in state courts.”151 However, the 
majority considered this result unremarkable and appropriate, be-
cause it believed that the “‘ªnal decision’” ripeness rule and other 
developments predating Williamson County had minimized the federal 
courts’ role in takings litigation and given state courts more experi-
                                                                                                                      
145 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2505 (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 
461, 477 (1982)). 
146 Id. The majority speciªcally stated that, in the absence of a Congressional mandate 
to the contrary, it would “apply [the] normal assumption that the weighty interest in 
ªnality and comity trump the interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional ap-
pellate tribunal.” Id. 
147 Id. at 2506. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. The majority claimed that “[r]eading Williamson County to preclude plaintiffs 
from raising [federal takings] claims in the alternative [in state court] would erroneously 
interpret our cases as requiring property owners to ‘resort to piecemeal litigation or oth-
erwise unfair procedures.’” Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 
477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986)). Interestingly, this same principle could support rejection of 
Williamson County, but for some reason the majority did not see ªt to address Williamson 
County’s primary effect, its impact on federal litigation, much less conclude that it amounts 
to an “unfair procedure.” MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7. 
151 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506. 
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ence in that area.152 The majority opined that “state courts undoubt-
edly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the 
complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and 
land-use regulations.”153 Finally, the majority justiªed relegation of 
takings claims to state courts on the basis of a tax case, Fair Assessment 
in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary,154 which bars taxpayers from asserting 
constitutional challenges against “‘the validity of state tax systems in 
federal courts.’”155
 In conclusion, the majority scoffed at San Remo’s claims as “little 
more than the concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-
court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead required in order 
to ripen federal takings claims.”156 Even if unfair, the majority noted 
that the Court was “not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute 
solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum.”157
3. The Concurring Opinion: Williamson County Was Wrong 
 In a concurrence written by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist—and 
joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Thomas—four justices 
agreed that preclusion barred San Remo’s claims “[w]hatever the rea-
sons for petitioners’ chosen course of litigation in the state courts.”158 
But in so doing, the concurrence sharply questioned the doctrinal basis 
and preclusive impacts of Williamson County’s state procedures re-
quirement.159
 The concurrence complained that “[i]t is not obvious that either 
constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all 
state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal tak-
ings claim.”160 The concurrence also questioned Williamson County’s 
reliance on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.161 and Parratt v. Taylor 162 as 
precedent for the state procedures requirement.163 The concurrence 
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. (quoting Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). 
153 Id. at 2507. 
154 454 U.S. 100 (1981). 
155 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
159 Id. at 2508. 
160 Id. 
161 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
162 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
163 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2508 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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additionally recognized that “Williamson County’s state-litigation rule 
has created some real anomalies . . . “ in combination with preclusion 
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,164 that prevent ripe claims from be-
ing heard in federal court.165 This led the concurring justices “to 
think that the justiªcations for [Williamson County’s] state-litigation 
requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dra-
matic.”166 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence rejected the 
majority’s reliance on the Fair Assessment tax case, as there was no 
“longstanding principle of comity toward state courts” in takings cases 
that would justify extending Fair Assessment to relegate all just com-
pensation claims to state courts.167
 Believing that experience showed Williamson County’s state proce-
dures rule to be “mistaken,”168 and ªnding no reason “why federal tak-
ings claims in particular should be singled out to be conªned to state 
court in the absence of any asserted justiªcation or congressional direc-
tive,”169 the concurring justices advocated reconsidering the propriety of 
the state procedures requirement in a future “appropriate case.”170
III. The Court Should Not Have Singled Out Just 
Compensation Claimants as Unªt to Invoke  
England or Another Preclusion Exception  
to Obtain a Federal Forum for Ripe Claims 
 The most startling aspect of the San Remo IV opinion is the major-
ity’s conclusion that ripe federal just compensation claims must now 
be heard exclusively in state courts because such claims can never 
avoid preclusion.171 This jurisdictional revolution rests on two dubious 
conclusions: ªrst, that takings claimants are undeserving of a preclu-
sion exception; and second, that Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank’s 
state procedures requirement should not be disturbed in requiring 
                                                                                                                      
164 Id. at 2508; see supra note 7 (deªning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 
165 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
166 Id. at 2509–10. 
167 Id. at 2508–09. 
168 Id. at 2507. 
169 Id. at 2509. 
170 Id. at 2510. The concurrence concluded that San Remo IV was not the appropriate 
case to consider Williamson County because “no court below has addressed the correctness 
of Williamson County, neither party has asked us to reconsider it, and resolving the issue 
could not beneªt petitioners.” Id. 
171 See supra Part II. 
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just compensation claims to be ªled initially in state court.172 The ªrst 
conclusion is explicit; the second is implicit.173 Because the operation 
of the state procedures requirement is critical to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, the majority’s refusal to directly address that requirement is 
the great puzzle of San Remo IV. However, the Court’s thin construc-
tion of England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners and its 
general refusal to create a preclusion exception for takings claimants 
forced into state court litigation are disturbing in their own right, and 
worthy of careful consideration. 
 To usefully explore San Remo IV’s construction of preclusion and 
the role of the England reservation, we must be clear about the scope 
of the Court’s preclusion holding. Although the question presented 
concerned only issue preclusion and England’s ability to shield takings 
claimants from that doctrine,174 the question the Court answered was 
whether England provided an exception to the application of the Full 
Faith and Credit Act (the Act),175 which the San Remo IV Court point-
edly noted includes both issue and claim preclusion.176 San Remo IV’s 
refusal to recognize an England exception to the Act for takings 
claimants is therefore properly construed as a refusal to recognize an 
exception to either issue preclusion or claim preclusion.177
 As noted above, the Court construed England to be unavailable to 
claimants complying with Williamson County because it considered the 
following to be necessary conditions for reservation: proper invoca-
tion of the federal court’s jurisdiction prior to state court litigation 
and application of abstention,178 which directs the case to state court 
to allow that court to decide a state statutory issue that may moot the 
federal controversy.179 Through this interpretation, England is no help 
                                                                                                                      
172 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506–07 (2005); see also id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) (stating that “once a government entity has reached a ªnal decision with re-
spect to a claimant’s property, the claimant must seek compensation in state court before 
bringing a federal takings claim in federal court.”); Stardust Mobile Estates LLC v. City of 
San Buenaventura, 142 F. App’x 300, 301 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that San Remo IV declined 
to “reconsider” the ripeness requirements of Williamson County). 
173 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
174 See Brief for Petitioner at i, San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (No. 04-340). 
175 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501. 
176 Id. at 2500. 
177 Although the Court does not make this point expressly, it does so by result and by 
stressing—after making clear that San Remo could not avoid issue preclusion under Eng-
land—that “[f]ederal courts . . . are not free to disregard 28 U.S.C. § 1738 [the Full Faith 
and Credit Act].” Id. at 2502 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2505. 
178 See id. at 2503. 
179 See id. at 2502. 
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to would-be federal takings claimants because a lack of ripeness pre-
vents the plaintiffs from properly invoking federal jurisdiction in the 
ªrst instance and their state court litigation does not center on a state 
statutory issue.180 This is an unnecessarily mechanical view of England 
and its application to takings claims.181
A. Involuntary State Court Litigation Seems More Important to England 
Than “Properly Invoking Federal Jurisdiction” 
 In England, the Court appeared driven to secure a federal forum 
for all federal claimants that did not freely submit their claims to state 
court.182 The Court’s concern was that federal constitutional plaintiffs 
could lose federal district court review “without . . . consent and 
through no fault of [their] own” by being thrust into involuntary state 
court litigation that would trigger preclusion.183 This smacked of un-
fairness not only because it took the choice of a state forum, and fed-
eral preclusion, out of the plaintiff’s hands,184 but also because it left 
only the possibility of Supreme Court review, which the Court consid-
ered an inadequate substitute for district court proceedings.185
 The England reservation seemed designed to respond to the un-
fairness of precluding district court review based on involuntary state 
court litigation by allowing plaintiffs to neutralize the preclusive effects 
of that litigation, thereby regaining the ability to litigate in federal 
court.186 As such, it reºected the Court’s understanding that preclusion 
is fairly applied only when it results from the litigant’s own choices.187 
Thus, the England Court stressed: “if a party freely and without reservation 
submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them 
there, and has them decided there, then—whether or not he seeks di-
rect review . . . in this Court—he has elected to forgo his right to return 
                                                                                                                      
180 See id. at 2503, 2505. 
181 See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing cases recognizing the ability of takings claimants to 
invoke the England reservation). 
182 See 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964) (expressing desire to craft a rule preventing “proce-
dural traps operating to deprive [litigants involuntarily in state court] of their right to a 
District Court determination of their federal claims.” (emphasis added)); Wicker v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Knott County, 826 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1987) (ªling by plaintiff in state court 
prior to federal court abstention order may utilize England reservation). 
183 England, 375 U.S. at 415. 
184 See id. 
185 Id. at 416. 
186 See id. at 418–20. 
187 Id. at 417 (“The possibility of appellate review by this Court of a state court deter-
mination may not be substituted, against a party’s wishes, for his right to litigate his federal 
claims fully in the federal courts.” (emphasis added)). 
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to the District Court.”188 Given the Court’s sense that it is fair to apply 
federal preclusion only to plaintiffs whose own actions trigger preclu-
sion—those who willingly litigate federal issues in state court—the 
availability of the England reservation seemed to hinge on whether 
plaintiffs are in state court involuntary, not upon the precise proce-
dural path that got them there.189
 It is true that the England Court, in crafting the reservation, re-
ferred to a plaintiff who had “properly invoked the [court’s] jurisdic-
tion.”190 But this may reasonably be viewed as nothing more than an 
innocuous reference to the facts of England. Certainly, it is difªcult to 
view the reference to a plaintiff who “properly” invokes jurisdiction as a 
mandatory prerequisite to the England reservation—and availability of 
federal review—when England otherwise appears willing to deny a fed-
eral forum only to plaintiffs whose voluntary acts invite preclusion.191 
In the post-England case of Migra v. Warren City School District Board of 
Education, the Court appeared to conªrm that the issue of voluntariness 
was more important than adherence to a precise procedural tem-
plate—properly invoking jurisdiction in the ªrst instance—when it 
stated England applies “when a litigant with a federal constitutional 
claim is involuntarily in state court.”192 Prior to San Remo IV, the federal 
courts were virtually unanimous in concluding that England’s primary 
focus was the voluntariness of litigation.193
 Given England’s reasoning, prospective federal takings plaintiffs 
had reason to believe they could invoke the England reservation even 
though they could not properly invoke federal jurisdiction, and secure 
abstention.194 Such claimants were, after all, forced to engage in state 
court takings litigation against their will by Williamson County.195 For this 
reason, they could be deprived of a federal forum due to “no fault of 
[their] own,”196 thus implicating the fairness concerns at the heart of 
                                                                                                                      
188 Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
189 See Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 1992). 
190 England, 375 U.S. at 415. 
191 See id. at 415–20. 
192 Fields, 953 F.2d at 1306; see Migra, 465 U.S. 75, 85 n.7 (1984). 
193 See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 182–92. 
195 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2508 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
196 England, 375 U.S. at 415. 
276 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:247 
England. Many federal courts agreed with this reading of England;197 the 
San Remo IV Court, however, did not.198
B. The State Statutory Issue Requirement Is Not Necessary to England 
 Although the conclusion that plaintiffs must be able to properly 
invoke federal jurisdiction probably ended the possibility that federal 
just compensation claimants could use the England reservation, the 
Court closed the deal by further noting that England only applies when 
the would-be federal litigant is sent to state court to litigate a state statu-
tory issue.199 This proposition appears to have arisen from the under-
standing that the England reservation operates to preserve federal 
claims while a state court makes a determination that “may moot the 
federal controversy.”200 The San Remo IV Court seems to suggest that a 
state statutory issue is an indispensable element of this process.201
 However, it is hardly clear that a statutory issue is always necessary 
to moot a federal claim; state constitutional protections may also 
sufªce.202 This is especially true in the takings context where a ruling 
on a state constitutional takings provision may result in just compensa-
tion under state law and thereby moot a federal claim for just compen-
sation.203 Indeed, the entire point of Williamson County’s state compen-
sation procedures requirement is to provide an opportunity for “the 
state courts [to] adjust state law to avoid or alter the constitutional 
question.”204 Therefore, while England is surely designed to preserve 
federal claims while state law litigation determines whether they are 
moot, there is no obvious reason why a state statutory issue must be 
present.205 Certainly, England’s language allows more, since it stressed a 
desire to avoid “‘questions of [federal] constitutionality on the basis of 
                                                                                                                      
197 See, e.g, DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 523–24 (6th Cir. 2004); Santini v. 
Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003); Fields, 953 F.2d at 
1305–06. See generally supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
198 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–02. 
199 See id. at 2502 (“‘[t]ypical’ England cases generally involve federal constitutional 
challenges to a state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the statute in a 
particular manner.” (citing England, 375 U.S. at 420)). 
200 See id. 
201 See id. 
202 See Dodd I, 59 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 1995). 
203 See id. at 860–61. 
204 See id. at 860. 
205 See Fields, 953 F.2d at 1304–05. But Meacham has argued that England is not appli-
cable to takings claims because “[a]n England reservation works where the state court is 
deciding the applicability of a statute, as distinguished from the constitutionality of the 
statute.” Meacham, supra note 3, at 250. 
2006] The San Remo Hotel Decision 277 
preliminary guesses regarding local law,’”206 which can be fairly con-
strued to include local constitutional provisions as well as statutes.207
 The San Remo IV Court bolsters its emphasis on a state statute— 
and its corresponding disregard for state constitutional provisions—by 
declaring that the federal issues sought to be reserved under England 
must be “distinct” from the state law issues referred to the state 
court.208 Yet, the basis for requiring that the state law issue be distinct 
from the reserved federal issue is also unclear.209 Perhaps the idea is 
consistent with the England facts;210 but in crafting the England reserva-
tion, the Court never said that the reservation depended on a manifest 
difference between the state and federal issues.211
 Morever, there is no apparent logical basis for imputing a re-
quirement that litigated state court issues be distinct from reserved 
federal issues in order to warrant England protection. Perhaps one can 
see such a requirement as a proxy test for whether the federal issues 
were effectively litigated as part of the prior state court questions. 
Under this view, if the reserved federal issues are distinct from the 
state court issues, then it can be presumed that the federal issues were 
not previously litigated and issue preclusion would not apply. But this 
amounts to a rule that the England reservation applies when issue 
preclusion does not. As such, it assumes that England is only available 
for claim preclusion, an assertion not found in San Remo IV. 212
                                                                                                                      
206 England, 375 U.S. 411, 416 n.7 (1964) (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. 
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). 
207 See Fields, 953 F.2d at 1304–05. 
208 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2502 (2005). 
209 See id.; England, 375 U.S. at 413–15. 
210 See England, 375 U.S. at 413–14. The distinctness of issues is not clearly evident in 
the facts. Although the England plaintiffs had a state statutory issue in state court—whether 
the statute applied to them—that was distinct from their federal due process and equal 
protection issues, the state and federal issues were not litigated separately. Id. “They did 
not restrict those [state court] proceedings to the question whether the Medical Practice 
Act applied to chiropractors. They unreservedly submitted for decision, and briefed and 
argued, their contention that the Act, if applicable to chiropractors, violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.” Id. at 413. 
211 See id. at 413–15 (implying a distinctness of issues). 
212 Some language in the opinion can be read to suggest that the Court views England 
as potentially available only to neutralize claim preclusion. See, e.g., San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2503 (“our [England] opinion made it perfectly clear that the effective reservation of a 
federal claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs take no action to broaden the 
scope of the state court’s review beyond decision of the antecedent state-law issue.”) (em-
phasis added). This would make sense given the Court’s emphasis on the necessity of dis-
tinct federal and state issues, but it is hard to square with England where the Court offered 
the reservation to plaintiffs who actually raised federal issues in state court, and would 
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 If the England reservation provides a shield against both issue and 
claim preclusion, as England indicates,213 then it makes no sense to 
require distinct state court and reserved issues—to require an absence 
of issue preclusion—as a prerequisite for the England reservation. As 
an exception to issue preclusion, the England reservation is necessarily 
designed to apply when the state court and federal issues are not dis-
tinct.214 So, to say that the state court issues must be distinct from the 
reserved federal issues, as the Supreme Court’s San Remo IV opinion 
does, is tantamount to saying that the England exception is available 
only when it is not necessary in the ªrst place. 
 In sum, until San Remo IV, the exact factual and procedural cir-
cumstances in England did not seem necessary to the England reserva-
tion.215 Instead, what seemed necessary was involuntary state court liti-
gation that was designed to moot a federal constitutional concern, but 
which might have the unintended effect of unfairly precluding plain-
tiffs from litigating their claims in federal court.216 Under this view, it 
was reasonable to conclude that the procedural circumstances in Eng-
land were sufªcient to trigger the reservation because they implicated 
the Court’s underlying concerns—fundamental fairness—not because 
they contained some talismanic force in themselves.217 When England is 
viewed in this light, federal takings litigants compelled by Williamson 
County to seek compensation in state courts under state law theories, 
for purposes of mooting a federal claim to compensation, had reason 
to invoke the England reservation.218
C. The Court Could Have Recognized an Exception to Preclusion  
for Takings Claimants 
 Even if the Court is correct that the England framework is not 
broad enough to include ripe takings claims, the Court could have 
created a general “San Remo” exception to preclusion to effectuate 
Williamson County’s promise that ripe takings claimants may be heard 
                                                                                                                      
therefore be subject to issue preclusion, except for the fact that the issues were litigated 
involuntarily. See England, 375 U.S. at 417–22. 
213 See supra text accompanying note 50; see also England, 375 U.S. at 421–22 (“When 
the reservation has been made, [the involuntary state court litigant’s] right to return [to 
federal court] will in all events be preserved.” (emphasis added)). 
214 See England, 375 U.S. at 413–22. 
215 See supra Part II.B.1. 
216 See supra Part I.A.3. 
217 See England, 375 U.S. at 413–22; Fields, 953 F.2d at 1305–06. 
218 See id. 
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in federal court.219 In refusing this course, the Court claimed that it 
had no power to craft an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act 
without express authorization from Congress.220 This is extremely 
puzzling because, even under San Remo IV’s crabbed view of England, 
it is difªcult to conceive of the England reservation as anything but a 
Court-crafted exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act.221 even un-
der the San Remo IV Court’s crabbed view of England.222
 As we have seen, the San Remo IV Court considered England rele-
vant only when plaintiffs with federal constitutional claims and state 
statutory claims properly invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction, and the 
court invokes abstention for purposes of allowing a state court to liti-
gate a state law issue that may moot the federal claims.223 Even in this 
situation, a strict application of the Full Faith and Credit Act should 
preclude the plaintiffs from rearguing their federal claims because 
claim preclusion bars litigation of any claims that “could have been 
raised” in a prior judicial proceeding, as well as those that are actually 
raised.224 Because San Remo IV’s prototypical England plaintiff could 
raise his federal constitutional claims in the court-mandated state pro-
ceeding, an uncompromising application of preclusion—the applica-
tion approved of in San Remo IV—should bar the return to federal 
court.225 San Remo IV acknowledges, however, that the England Court 
created a reservation approach that is at least capable of neutralizing 
preclusion in this situation.226
 Since the Court created a preclusion exception in England with-
out express Congressional authorization, it is hard to understand why 
it is powerless to do so in the takings context. This attitude cannot be 
                                                                                                                      
219 See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeal’s recognition of an England-style reservation exception in Fields v. Sarasota Mana-
tee Airport Authority); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’s 
creation of a “Santini” reservation in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management 
Service). 
220 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2505–06 (2005). 
221 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–03; England, 375 U.S. at 423, 429–30 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (describing the England reservation as a “judge-made rule”). 
222 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–03. 
223 See supra notes 133–40 and accompanying text. 
224 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2500 n.16 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 
(1980)). 
225 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491–92 (1949) (noting that by “sending a fragment 
of the litigation to a state court, the federal court might ªnd itself blocked by res judicata, 
with the result that the entire federal controversy would be ousted from the federal courts, 
where it was placed by Congress.”); see also San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2502–03, 2507. 
226 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2503 (noting that San Remo might have effectively re-
served its facial federal claims while litigating a state statutory issue). 
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plausibly explained by the presence of abstention in England since 
“[a]bstention is [also] a judge-fashioned vehicle . . . .”227 Nor can 
strict deference to Congress in the takings context and no deference 
in the England context be adequately explained by the inability of tak-
ings claimants to properly invoke federal jurisdiction in the ªrst in-
stance, for this disability was also created by the Court.228 One is faced 
then with the real possibility that the Court refused to recognize a 
preclusion exception for takings claimants because it did not want to, 
rather than because it was powerless to do so under England or with-
out Congressional authorization.229
 Indeed, an argument can be made that the Court was not only 
able, but obligated to recognize a preclusion exception for federal 
just compensation claimants. After all, Williamson County’s state pro-
cedures requirement purports to be a “constitutionally-grounded” 
ripeness rule that permits a federal claim for compensation to pro-
ceed in federal court after state litigation.230 On the other hand, as 
Justice Douglas stated in his concurring England opinion, “res judicata 
is not a constitutional principle . . . .”231 Therefore, one might have 
expected that the nonconstitutional preclusion doctrine must bow to 
Williamson County’s constitutional ripeness doctrine, permitting ripe 
takings claims in federal court. The San Remo IV Court’s opposite de-
cision is confusing because it appears to elevate a statutory principle 
over a constitutional one.232
 Even if one ignores the allegedly constitutional character of Wil-
liamson County’s state procedures rule—as the San Remo IV majority 
did—it does not follow that deference to Congress requires strict en-
forcement of the Full Faith and Credit Act. Congress has expressed an 
intention that federal courts should have jurisdiction to hear all federal 
questions.233 Congress gave federal courts power to hear federal consti-
tutional questions in part because “federal judges appointed for life are 
more likely to enforce the constitutional rights of unpopular minorities 
                                                                                                                      
227 See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (emphasis 
added). Because abstention is judicially created, saying that abstention gives the Court 
power to create a preclusion exception without Congressional blessing is tantamount to 
saying that the Court gives itself the power. 
228 See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
194–95 (1985). 
229 See England, 375 U.S. at 411. 
230 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–95. 
231 England, 375 U.S. at 429 (Douglas, J., concurring) (second emphasis added). 
232 See generally San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
233 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
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than elected state judges.”234 Issues arising under the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment have always been considered federal questions, 
and the San Remo IV Court makes no contrary representations.235 
Therefore, if the San Remo IV Court wanted to proceed by way of defer-
ence to Congress, it might have done so by securing federal jurisdiction 
over federal just compensation questions, not by rigidly applying pre-
clusion.236 The Court would have effected Congress’s intent to protect 
individuals—including property owners—from potential state court 
bias in favor of the local majority.237
 By turning away from authority and principles that could have 
justiªed an England-type exception for takings claimants, the San Remo 
IV Court has singled out property owners as second-class constitu-
tional claimants.238 By closing the federal courthouse door, the Court 
has not only branded takings claims as the only claims unworthy of 
federal protection, but also has effectively nulliªed the claimants’ 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in federal court.239 Further-
more, by predicating England on the jurisdictional posture of the case 
rather than on the involuntariness of state litigation, the Court has 
branded takings claims as the only constitutional claims to which the 
England reservation does not apply.240
 Although the Supreme Court has admirably declared that the 
federal takings clause is not a “poor relation” in the constitutional hi-
                                                                                                                      
234 England, 375 U.S. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
235 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506–07. 
236 See id. at 2505. 
237 See Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings § 13.5(d), at 1069 (2d ed. 2001) (“The 
fact that there are . . . more competing interests in their districts also makes [federal 
judges] more disposed to vindicate the exercises of property rights that do not beneªt 
immediate neighbors.”). 
238 Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 690 (“That property owners have been singled 
out [for relegation to state courts] is clear.”); Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 3, at 196 
(“the ripeness and abstention doctrines have uniquely denied property owners, unlike the 
bearers of other constitutional rights, access to the federal courts on their federal claims”). 
239 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–03. 
240 As one federal district court put it: 
[I]t deªes logic and common sense to say that all federal Constitutional issues 
(save taking ones) which are coupled with signiªcant State court questions 
which are not automatically precluded as unripe, may be preserved by a res-
ervation for a return visit to a federal court, but so-coupled federal taking 
claims may not because they (unlike the others) are precluded from being 
brought in the ªrst instance in a federal court. The reason for this court-
made distinction . . . . just makes no sense. 
W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southhampton, 220 F. Supp. 2d 140, 148 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
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erarchy,241 the Court’s failure in San Remo IV to bend preclusion to 
ensure that takings claims are given as much federal attention as 
other claims makes a mockery of this sentiment.242
IV. San Remo’s Relegation of Claims to State Courts  
Rests on Williamson County’s Bankrupt State  
Procedures Requirement 
 Although the Court’s application of the Full Faith and Credit Act 
is deserving of criticism, it cannot be blamed for San Remo IV’s star-
tling conclusion that “a signiªcant number of plaintiffs will necessarily 
litigate their federal takings claims in state courts.”243 Preclusion is, 
after all, wholly dependent on prior litigation,244 and there is only one 
reason that such prior litigation routinely occurs in the takings con-
text: Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank.245 Therefore, no matter how 
strongly the Court interprets the Full Faith and Credit Act or how 
narrowly it construes England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Exam-
iners, it cannot be said that this causes takings claims to be relegated 
to the state courts.246 That distinction goes entirely to Williamson 
County: if not for the state procedures requirement, few just compen-
sation claimants would confront preclusion because they would simply 
avoid state courts.247
 Consequently, by accepting that federal just compensation claims 
must be litigated in state courts, the San Remo IV majority appears to 
afªrm that Williamson County requires takings claimants to initially ªle 
just compensation claims in state court,248 while disavowing the idea 
                                                                                                                      
241 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
242 See James W. Ely Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing 
Rights of Property Owners, 2005 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 39–69. 
243 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005). 
244 Id. at 2501 (“The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit statute [is 
that the] parties should not be permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved by 
courts of competent jurisdiction . . . .”). 
245 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). 
246 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–03, 2505–06. Applying tort terminology, one might 
say that the San Remo IV Court’s strict construction of preclusion may supply a “but-for” 
cause for the relegation of federal just compensation claims, but Williamson County’s state 
procedures rule is the proximate cause. See id. at 2501; Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. 
247 The prevalence of pre-Williamson County federal court takings litigation attests to 
this proposition. For speciªc examples of such litigation, see infra note 283 and accompa-
nying text. 
248 Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that San 
Remo IV afªrmed that “plaintiffs must take their case for compensation to the state courts” 
under Williamson County); Starr v. Shucet, No. 1:05CV00026, 2005 WL 1657102, at *3 n.2 
(W.D. Va. July 15, 2005) (stating that San Remo “left the holding in Williamson [County] 
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that compliance with this rule ripens claims for federal adjudication. 
After all, if state court litigants complying with Williamson County can-
not mature their claims for federal review, as San Remo IV dictates, 
then the state procedures requirement is not the ripeness prerequisite 
presented by Williamson County; it is simply a “litigate in state court” 
rule.249
 And yet, the majority never directly expresses these views.250 The 
opinion fails to explain how a ban on federal review can be reconciled 
with Williamson County’s premise that state court litigation ripens fed-
eral review.251 The majority also does not acknowledge or address the 
deep conceptual problems with the state procedures requirement it 
afªrms.252 Instead of acknowledging the Williamson County rule driv-
ing its opinion, the majority supports the relegation of claims to state 
courts with factual propositions about superior state court takings ex-
perience.253 These propositions are demonstrably incorrect, but to 
the extent they have any validity, they merely reinforce the need to 
directly address Williamson County’s state procedures requirement.254
A. All of San Remo IV’s Roads Lead to Williamson County 
1. Williamson County’s Ripeness Doctrine Gave Plaintiffs a Belief They 
Had a Right to a Federal Forum 
 The majority’s ªrst basis for approving the relegation of just com-
pensation claims to state courts is a rejection of the notion that just 
compensation claimants like San Remo have a right to a federal fo-
rum.255 In criticizing this idea, the majority acts as if it is dealing with a 
miscalculation about preclusion.256 This is a straw-man. San Remo IV 
and other federal takings claimants have been entirely cognizant of po-
                                                                                                                      
undisturbed.”); Stardust Mobile Estates LLC v. City of San Buenaventura, No. 03-1793207, 
2005 WL 1793207, at *1 (9th Cir. July 29, 2005) (stating that San Remo IV “declin[ed] to 
reconsider the Williamson County ripeness requirements”). 
249 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2505–06. 
250 See id. at 2503–07. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
253 See id. at 2506–07. 
254 See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
194 (1985). 
255 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2504. 
256 Id. (“We have repeatedly held, to the contrary, that issues actually decided in valid 
state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the ‘right’ to have their federal claims 
relitigated in federal court.”). 
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tential preclusion barriers to later federal review when they engage in 
mandated state court litigation.257 They have nevertheless believed that 
they had a right to federal review because Williamson County seems to 
promise it, as a matter of constitutional ripeness, following state court 
litigation.258 The Williamson County Court consistently and repeatedly 
presented the state procedures requirement as a ripeness barrier—a 
preliminary step toward obtaining federal review.259 As the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals acknowledged shortly before San Remo IV, Williamson 
County’s ripeness language creates an “expectation . . . that an unsuc-
cessful state plaintiff will then return to federal court.”260
 A strict application of preclusion that bars takings claims litigated 
in accordance with Williamson County is inconsistent with the ripeness 
premises and the promises of the state procedures requirement, as 
well as the jurisdictional expectations it engenders. Nothing in Wil-
liamson County indicated that preclusion would trump ripeness under 
the state procedures rule, stranding claimants in state court.261 Such a 
result was “clearly not contemplated by the Court in Williamson County 
. . . .”262 Therefore, it was entirely reasonable for San Remo and other 
federal just compensation claimants to conclude that they had a right 
to a federal forum after losing in state court notwithstanding the pre-
clusion doctrine.263
                                                                                                                      
257 See DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 518 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004). 
258 See id. (stating that Williamson County “clearly contemplates that a takings plaintiff 
who loses her claim in state court will have a day in federal court”); see also Berger, supra 
note 3, at 104 (explaining that the Williamson County Court repeatedly used language indi-
cating that “land use cases can be ripened and then litigated in federal court.”). 
259 See Dodd I, 59 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We deem it extremely signiªcant that 
the [Williamson County] Court characterized the compensation element as an issue of ripe-
ness. The central concern of ripeness is whether the case involves uncertain or contingent 
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”). 
260 DLX, 381 F.3d at 521; see also Meacham, supra note 3, at 239 (“When the Supreme 
Court established the ripeness requirement in Williamson, it did so in language that sug-
gested that, eventually, a litigant’s taking claim would be heard in federal court.”); Roberts, 
Ripeness, supra note 3, at 39 (“the ripeness label applied to prong two is misleading for it 
suggests that a claim may be heard in federal court after a state court denies compensa-
tion”); Roberts, Procedural Implications, supra note 3, at 10,356 (“the Williamson County opin-
ion suggested that once the landowner sought compensation in the state court and lost on 
the merits or was awarded an amount of compensation deemed inadequate, it would then 
be timely to bring suit in federal court”). 
261 See Dodd I, 59 F.3d at 861 (“We disagree . . . with the suggestion that Williamson 
County is a thinly-veiled attempt by the Court to eliminate the federal forum for Fifth 
Amendment taking plaintiffs . . . .”). 
262 DLX, 381 F.3d at 523 n.9. 
263 Daniel Mandelker et al., Federal Land Use Law 4A-23 (2004). 
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 However, in chastising San Remo for asserting a right to a federal 
forum, the San Remo IV majority ignores Williamson County’s role in 
creating an expectation of a federal forum.264 This is remarkable be-
cause the ripeness promises in Williamson County—followed by lower 
courts—formed the heart of San Remo’s case.265 San Remo did not 
simply argue that issue preclusion did not apply, as the majority opin-
ion implies; it contended that Williamson County’s ripening effect 
trumped preclusion.266 San Remo’s ªrst argument in its brief on the 
merits was that “Williamson County was not intended to bar takings 
claims from the federal courts”267 because under that decision, “tak-
ings plaintiffs may ripen their federal takings claims and then pursue 
them in federal court.”268 The majority’s refusal to address these ripe-
ness arguments seems highly unfair. Furthermore, in the absence of 
such consideration, the Court’s denial of San Remo’s asserted right to 
a federal forum is incomplete and unpersuasive. 
2. Williamson County Has Given State Courts Control of Takings 
Litigation for Two Decades 
 The San Remo IV majority seeks to support its permanent ban on 
federal review of just compensation claims with other non-Williamson 
County justiªcations.269 Most signiªcantly, it asserts that takings claims 
have been traditionally heard in state courts due to a pre-Williamson 
County “ªnal decision” ripeness rule: 
It was settled well before Williamson County that “a claim that 
the application of government regulations effects a taking of 
a property interest is not ripe until the government entity 
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a 
ªnal decision regarding the application of the regulations to 
the property at issue.” As a consequence, there is scant precedent 
                                                                                                                      
264 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005). 
265 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 174, at 10–14. San Remo lists all the instances in 
Williamson County in which the Court stated that the property owner’s federal takings claim 
in that case was merely premature or not ripe for failure to exhaust state compensation 
procedures. Id. at 11. 
266 See id. at 12 (“Nothing in the Williamson County opinion even suggests that the out-
come of state compensation procedures could preclude a federal takings claim . . . . [T]hat 
result would be inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in Williamson County.”). 
267 Id. at 10 (capitalization removed). 
268 Id. at 10–11. 
269 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2504–07 (2005). See generally Williamson County 
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
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for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency 
has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s tak-
ings clause. To the contrary, most of the cases in our takings 
jurisprudence, including nearly all of the cases on which pe-
titioners rely, came to us on writs of certiorari from state 
courts of last resort.270
Both the premises and conclusions of this reasoning are demonstrably 
false. 
 First, contrary to the majority opinion, the “ªnal decision” ripe-
ness rule has nothing to do with the modern—post-1985—decline of 
federal courts in takings litigation.271 Unlike the state procedures re-
quirement, the ªnal decision rule does not require litigation in state 
court,272 or exhaustion of local administrative remedies; it only re-
quires an administrative land use decision that renders takings issues 
ªt for review.273 Therefore, a ªnal decision cannot trigger application 
of preclusion doctrines. Rather, assuming a ªnal decision is the only 
ripeness barrier, a claimant satisfying that requirement may sue im-
mediately in either state or federal court.274
 Even putting aside the majority’s reliance on the ªnal decision 
rule, its conclusion that there is “scant precedent” for federal litigation 
is patently false as an empirical matter.275 Between June 26, 1978—the 
date the Court decided Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
276 which provided the modern regulatory takings test—and June 28, 
                                                                                                                      
270 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
271 See id. (stating ªnal decision rule). 
272 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001) (ªnding under the ªnal deci-
sion ripeness rule that “once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to per-
mit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened . . . . [A] landowner may not 
establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable 
procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation.”). 
273 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192–93 (explaining that the ªnal decision re-
quirement is different from and does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies 
that “result in a[n administrative] judgment whether the [agency’s] actions violated any of 
[the property owner’s] rights.”). 
274 See, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that case was easily ripe for federal court review under ªnal decision prong and 
focusing on ripeness under state compensation procedures requirement). 
275 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005). 
276 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the Court articulated this modern regulatory 
takings balancing test: “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-
ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the gov-
ernmental action.” See id. at 124 (citation omitted). For general discussion of the scope of 
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1985—the date the Court issued Williamson County—there were ap-
proximately 141 federal district court cases involving federal takings 
claims against regulation.277 By contrast, there were just 109 similar 
state court cases.278 Federal courts were also central in pre-1978 regula-
tory takings jurisprudence. In the period between 1922—the year Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon 279 was decided—and 1978, there were approxi-
mately 174280 more instances of “litigation in federal district court of 
claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause.”281
 The majority does no better with its conclusion that “most” Su-
preme Court takings cases have arisen from state courts;282 since Penn 
Central, the majority of the Court’s certiorari grants in takings cases 
have been to federal courts. In fact, the Court has taken nineteen ma-
jor takings cases arising from federal district courts since 1978,283 but 
                                                                                                                      
Penn Central’s test, see J. David Breemer & R. S. Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of In-
vestment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and the Lower Courts’ Disturbing Insistence on Wal-
lowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. L. Rev. 351 (2005). 
277 These cases were collated through a Westlaw search of (“just compensation” & tak-
ing & “ªfth Amendment” & regulat!) in the federal district court opinion, DCT, database. 
278 These cases were identiªed running the search (“just compensation” & taking & 
“ªfth Amendment” & regulat!) in the Westlaw ALLSTATES database. 
279 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
280 This number was arrived at by running the following search (da(aft 12/11/1922 & 
bef 6/26/1978) & “just compensation” & taking & “ªfth amendment” & regulat!) in the 
Westlaw DCT database. 
281 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005). 
282 To emphasize its erroneous point that Supreme Court takings cases arise from state 
court litigation, the majority singles out Mahon, “which spawned our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence,” as an example of an important takings case coming from state courts. San 
Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506 n.26. A different majority may have better served the reader— 
and takings history—by singling out Williamson County itself, a case originally litigated in 
federal district court for the Middle District Court of Tennessee. See Williamson County 
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
283 The federal cases include: San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005); Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498 (1998); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Con-
crete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 
(1993); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Hodel v. Irving, 481 
U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); 
FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Beneªt Guar. Corp., 475 
U.S. 211 (1986); Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986 (1984); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
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only fourteen from state courts.284 Even after Williamson County, certio-
rari grants in taking cases from federal courts exceed those from state 
courts.285 To the extent that the Court has recently considered propor-
tionately fewer takings cases from federal courts and more from state 
courts, this is hardly a result of some natural order in takings litigation; 
it results from the reality that Williamson County’s state procedures rule 
forces takings claims into the state court system.286 The same reality ex-
plains why state courts may currently have “more experience” than fed-
eral courts in tackling takings claims.287 Certainly, San Remo IV’s and 
other takings litigants’ protracted and desperate attempts to secure 
federal review belies any notion that state court experience results from 
plaintiffs’ preference for such courts. 
 Therefore, the San Remo IV majority’s attempt to support the rele-
gation of just compensation claims on non-Williamson County grounds 
fails miserably. The argument fails not only because the premises and 
conclusions are easily disproved, but also because the proof of their 
fallacy magniªes the centrality of Williamson County. The historical dis-
tribution of federal just compensation claims between state courts and 
federal courts simply cannot be discussed without considering William-
son County’s state procedures requirement; the majority, however, strives 
to do so to the point of positing transparently false reasoning.288
                                                                                                                      
284 The state court cases include: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 
U.S. 299 (1989); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 
340 (1986); Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Webb’s Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
285 Based on the lists provided in notes 283 and 284, it appears that since 1985 the Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari to seventeen major takings cases from federal courts 
and only nine from state courts. These lists do not include cases challenging government 
acts as a violation of the public use requirement of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. 
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
286 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. 
287 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2507. 
288 See id. 
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3. Reliance on Fair Assessment Highlights the Effect of Williamson 
County 
 As a ªnal basis for closing the federal court house door to just 
compensation claims, the San Remo IV majority analogizes to the Fair 
Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary tax case.289 In Fair Assessment, 
the Supreme Court held that taxpayers are barred by the principle of 
comity from asserting that claims for money damages under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 arising from an allegedly unconstitutional administration of a 
state tax scheme must be heard in state courts.290
 This holding was grounded in precedent—dating back to 1871— 
recognizing that comity principles prevent federal courts from inter-
fering with state taxation systems by hearing federally-based law-
suits.291 Much of the recent precedent was itself undergirded, if not 
directly justiªed, by the 1937 Tax Injunction Act that explicitly barred 
federal courts from enjoining, suspending, or restraining any state tax 
where “‘a plain, speedy and efªcient remedy may be had in the courts 
of such State.’”292
 While Fair Assessment and its comity principles might support a 
decision barring federal court takings suits against state taxation 
schemes, it does not support the total abdication of federal review of 
just compensation claims. As the San Remo IV concurrence explained, 
“[t]he Court today makes no claim that any such longstanding princi-
ple of comity toward state courts in handling federal takings claims 
existed at the time Williamson County was decided, nor that one has 
since developed.”293 Indeed, the fact is that for eighty years prior to 
Williamson County, no court suggested that comity or any other doc-
trine should cut back on the federal role in adjudicating just compen-
sation claims.294 Williamson County itself never recognized a comity or 
                                                                                                                      
289 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2507; Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 
454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981). 
290 Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116. 
[W]e hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting 
§ 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such 
taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, pro-
vided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and 
may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
291 See id. at 102 (quoting Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1871)). 
292 Id. at 103 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp IV 1980)). 
293 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2508–09 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
294 See supra note 277 (discussing frequency of federal court litigation of takings claims 
pre-Williamson County). 
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federalism principle warranting the relegation of just compensation 
claims to state court.295
 As a general matter, comity considerations no more warrant the 
complete denial of federal review of just compensation claims against 
state and local governments than they justify the denial of federal re-
view of free speech claims against such entities.296 One could say that 
states are most familiar with the complexities and realities of local re-
straints on free expression and other ofªcial time, place, and manner 
restrictions, and that adjudication of related conºicts should be left to 
the states. However, no one has seriously proposed this course of ac-
tion, likely because it would undermine the incorporation of the First 
Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the federal courts’ important role in providing a fair and unbi-
ased forum—insulated from local majoritarian pressure and elected 
state court judges.297 The same reasons counsel against divesting fed-
eral courts of their ability to hear Fifth Amendment just compensa-
tion claims against local and state governments.298
 The federal courts’ role in takings law has decreased relative to 
state courts in the last two decades, making the relegation of just 
compensation claims to these courts perhaps less sudden than relega-
tion of free speech.299 But again, the basis for the federal decline is 
                                                                                                                      
295 See generally Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985). 
296 The San Remo IV concurrence makes a similar point. See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 
2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
297 See Eagle, supra note 237, § 13-5(d), at 1069 (“Local judges generally are elected by 
local voters and tend to associate with the well being of the local electorate. . . . Federal 
judges tend to have broader outlooks than local judges constrained by ethos and elector-
ate of their communities”); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 
1115–30 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are superior in enforcing federal constitu-
tional rights). 
298 See Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripe-
ness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 73, 74 
(1988) (arguing for federal forum for takings claims raised against actions taken under 
color of state law because of state courts’ “inherent potential for bias” against claimants in 
such cases (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eagle, supra note 237, § 13-5(d), at 1069 
(“The fact that there are apt to be more competing interests in their districts also makes 
[federal judges] more disposed to vindicate the exercises of property rights that do not 
beneªt immediate neighbors.”); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking 
Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go To Avoid Adjudicating 
Land Use Cases, 10 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 91, 92–93 (1994) (arguing that “[i]t is ex-
tremely important that property owners have access to federal courts” because “[a]n al-
most certain prejudice is created by having an elected or appointed state judge, sitting in 
the same local area as the alleged taking, decide the case.”). 
299 See supra notes 271–88 and accompanying text. 
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Williamson County.300 Therefore, if Fair Assessment’s comity principles 
support granting state courts exclusive control of federal just com-
pensation claims, it is only because Williamson County’s state proce-
dures rule has created a de facto and unintentional comity framework 
favoring those courts. 
B. Williamson County Was a Dead End from the Start 
 As the foregoing shows, the majority runs, but it cannot hide 
from the reality that its relegation of federal just compensation claims 
to state courts ultimately rests on and assumes the validity of William-
son County’s state procedures requirement.301 It is important, then, to 
brieºy reexamine that rule. According to the Williamson County Court, 
the requirement that federal just compensation litigants sue in state 
courts arises from: (1) the text of the Takings Clause, speciªcally the 
just compensation portion; (2) Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.;302 and (3) 
Parratt v. Taylor. 303 A basic examination of these premises shows that 
they do not have the effect imagined in Williamson County and that 
they are an entirely insupportable basis for relegating takings claims 
to state courts.304
1. Three Reasons, Three Strikes 
a. Strike One: The Claim to Federal Just Compensation Accrues at the Time of 
the Taking 
 The ªrst and most important basis for the state procedures re-
quirement was the Court’s understanding that the Takings Clause can 
be violated only after a state court denies compensation.305 The fun-
damental principle underlying this conclusion—that an action for a 
taking exists only if the challenged invasion of private property occurs 
“without just compensation”—is not controversial, but the conclusion 
that compensation can be deemed lacking only after state court litiga-
tion is dubious.306
                                                                                                                      
300 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172. 
301 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
302 See generally 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
303 See generally 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
304 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–97. 
305 See id. at 194. 
306 See Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 694 (“There is nothing in either logic or the 
language of the Fifth Amendment that requires municipal nonpayment [of compensation] 
to be certiªed by a state court before it is complete.”); Buchsbaum, supra note 39, at 473–
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 Certainly, nothing in the text of the Takings Clause requires one to 
interpret “without just compensation” to mean “without a state court 
ordering compensation.”307 Indeed, it is just as plausible to ªnd com-
pensation lacking when the responsible local entity fails to pay at the 
time of the alleged taking.308
  In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized over many 
years that the right to compensation, as well as the government’s duty 
to pay, accrues at the time of the challenged taking.309 For instance, in 
United States v. Dickinson, the Court declared: “the land was taken 
when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose.”310 Then, 
in 1980, the Court in United States v. Clarke repeated that “the usual 
rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and 
‘[i]t is that event which gives rise to the claim for compensation 
. . . .’”311 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles, the Court established that the same principles applied in the 
regulatory takings context.312
 The text of the Takings Clause is, therefore, at least as amenable 
to the theory that a property owner is “without just compensation” at 
the moment the government invades property without a guarantee of 
compensation, as it is to Williamson County’s idea that compensation is 
absent only after a state court afªrms the lack of compensation.313 
However, if just compensation can be said to be constitutionally ab-
sent at the time of the alleged taking, then a federal claim should be 
                                                                                                                      
74 (arguing that the suggestion that the government has not acted “illegally until you ask 
for compensation and then it is denied,” is false); Roberts, Ripeness, supra note 3, at 72 
(“The language of the Fifth Amendment does not dictate this [state procedures] rule.”). 
307 Buchsbaum, supra note 39, at 473; Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 695–96 (The 
Fifth Amendment “does not say ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation as ªnally determined by suing the municipal defendant in state court.’”). 
308 Brief Amici Curiae Elizabeth J. Neumont in Support of Petitioners at 8, San Remo 
IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005) (No. 04-340); Kassouni, supra note 3, at 43 (“[I]t makes little 
sense to require property owners to seek just compensation from the courts, as opposed to 
the governmental entity which imposed the regulation.”). 
309 See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947). 
310 Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 751. 
311 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 
U.S. 17, 22 (1958)). 
312 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (holding that the constitutional right to just compensa-
tion accrues as soon as private property has been taken). 
313 U.S. Const. amend. V; Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). 
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ripe at that time and Williamson County is wrong in requiring state 
court litigation.314
 The notion that a state court must deny compensation before a 
claimant can be said to be “without just compensation” is not only 
unnecessary under the Takings Clause and inconsistent with the 
Court’s traditional concept for the timing of a just compensation ob-
ligation, but is also illogical. After all, the local government, not the 
state, is sued for compensation in a typical § 1983 takings action.315 
This reality reafªrms the correctness of the pre-Williamson County un-
derstanding that a claim for compensation accrues when the local 
government engages in an uncompensated taking, not after a state 
court subsequently denies compensation.316
 Ultimately, there is no textual reason for construing the Just 
Compensation Clause to mandate state court litigation as a condition 
for federal ripeness. Furthermore, the state court litigation require-
ment cannot be recast as an exhaustion of local remedies principle.317 
The requirement simply exists without any plausible doctrinal basis. 
b. Strike Two: Monsanto’s Holding Does Not Support a Ripeness Rule Re-
quiring State Court Litigation 
 The Williamson County Court attempted to shore up the state pro-
cedures requirement with an analogy to Monsanto.318 This basis, how-
ever, is no sounder than the court’s reliance on the text of the Takings 
Clause. 
 The Williamson County Court declared that Monsanto established 
that “[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for ob-
taining compensation, and if resort to that process ‘yield[s] just com-
pensation,’ then the property owner ‘has no claim against the Gov-
ernment’ for a taking.”319 In the opinion of the Williamson County 
                                                                                                                      
314 Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 308, at 8 (“In asserting that a property owner’s 
monetary claim under the Just Compensation Clause does not accrue ‘until just compen-
sation has been denied’ by the state judicial system,’ Williamson County deviated sharply 
from the traditional understanding of that Clause.” (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 
195 n.13)). 
315 See Berger & Kanner, supra note 3, at 695. 
316 See First English, 482 U.S. at 315; Clarke, 445 U.S. at 258. 
317 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (holding that § 1983 claimants 
are not required to exhaust state remedies to sue in federal court). 
318 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–95; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986 (1984). 
319 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–95 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mon-
santo, 467 U.S. at 1013, 1018 n.21). 
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Court, Monsanto applied the foregoing principle to hold that “takings 
claims against the Federal Government are premature until the prop-
erty owner has availed itself of the process [for seeking compensa-
tion] provided by the Tucker Act.”320 Analogizing to these premises, 
Williamson County concluded that “if a State provides an adequate 
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot 
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation.”321
 If one accepts Williamson County’s interpretation of Monsanto, that 
case may seem to support the state procedures requirement. However, 
Monsanto does not stand for the propositions that the Williamson 
County Court claims and, consequently, cannot justify the state litiga-
tion requirement.322
 Unlike Williamson County, Monsanto did not involve a federal 
claim for just compensation; it involved a claim for injunctive and de-
claratory relief.323 Monsanto held that, regardless of whether or not 
the challenged acts caused a taking, the plaintiff was not entitled to 
injunctive relief.324 Monsanto’s rejection of injunctive relief is inappo-
site to the Williamson County issue of whether federal just compensa-
tion claims are premature and unripe in federal court prior to state 
court litigation: “[T]he [Monsanto] company’s request for equitable 
relief . . . was not merely premature, it was not available at all. In other 
words, there was nothing the company could do to ‘ripen’ its claim 
for equitable relief; that claim simply had no merit, period.”325
 The problems with Williamson County’s reliance on Monsanto are 
even more troubling because Monsanto merely held that takings 
claims against the federal government must be raised as just compen-
sation claims under the Tucker Act.326 This Tucker Act requirement is 
nothing like requiring takings claimants to ªle just compensation 
claims in state court before going to federal court.327 A claim under 
the Tucker Act is the assertion of a mature federal claim for compen-
sation, not a ripeness prerequisite designed to ready the claim for a 
later tribunal. Accordingly: 
                                                                                                                      
320 Id. at 195 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016–20). 
321 Id. 
322 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–95 (interpreting Monsanto). 
323 See id.; Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986. 
324 See 467 U.S. at 1020. 
325 Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 308, at 12. 
326 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1020. 
327 See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1020. 
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[I]f Williamson County were correct that [under Monsanto] a 
property owner must “avail[] itself of the process provided 
by the Tucker Act” before pursuing its claim for just compen-
sation, then it would be the rule that a property owner must 
essentially bring a Tucker Act suit before bringing a Tucker 
Act suit. In other words, an owner’s Tucker Act suit . . .  
would be “premature” until the property owner had brought 
a Tucker Act suit for just compensation. Obviously, this reduc-
tio ad absurdum deserves no respect . . . .328
Therefore, the Williamson County Court’s reliance on Monsanto was 
unfortunate and entirely unjustiªed. 
c. Strike Three: The Limited Postdeprivation Remedy Available in the Proce-
dural Due Process Context Has No Application to Takings Claims 
 Williamson County’s ªnal basis for the state procedures require-
ment is Parratt,329 a 1981 procedural due process decision. This 
justiªcation fares no better than the analogy to Monsanto. 
 In Parratt, the Court determined that a prisoner’s complaint al-
leging the negligent loss by prison ofªcials of a hobby kit constituted 
an actionable “deprivation” of property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.330 
The Court also concluded that there was no constitutional due proc-
ess violation until the plaintiff took advantage of an adequate postde-
privation remedy provided by Nebraska’s tort claims statute.331
 The Parratt Court declared that a “state’s action is not complete 
[in causing a constitutional injury] unless or until the state fails to 
provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.”332 
In Williamson County, the Court extended this reasoning to just com-
pensation claims to support the state procedures prerequisite.333 
There is no logical basis for doing so. Parratt’s holding—that no pro-
cedural due process violation occurs until the plaintiff utilizes a post-
deprivation process—applies only in the context of “a random and 
unauthorized act by a state employee.”334 Such a random act makes a 
                                                                                                                      
328 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 308, at 12 (third alteration in original) (quoting 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195). 
329 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
330 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544. 
331 Id. at 544–45. 
332 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541–42). 
333 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. 
334 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 543–44; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 
435–36 (1982). 
296 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:247 
predeprivation hearing “impossible or impracticable.”335 Parratt’s 
postdeprivation remedy requirement is not intended to apply where 
“deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established state 
policy or procedure, [since here] the State could provide predepriva-
tion process.”336
 The “established policy” exception to Parratt renders it irrelevant 
in the takings context because a regulatory taking of private property 
is always effected pursuant to an established policy or procedure.337 If 
interference with private property occurs by a government agent’s 
random act and without the blessing of established policy, it is a “tort, 
not a taking.”338
 Since a taking always ºows from an established policy, predepriva-
tion process is always possible; it therefore makes no sense to apply Par-
ratt’s postdeprivation remedial requirement to takings.339 Not only is 
predeprivation process possible, it routinely occurs before most regula-
tory takings. A local regulatory agency typically conducts hearings re-
sulting in ªndings and a decision arguably depriving a property owner 
of a protected property interest and deªnitely making no provision for 
compensation.340 Therefore, applying Parratt’s postdeprivation reme-
dial analysis to takings claims is not just inconsistent with Parratt’s prem-
ise that predeprivation process must be impossible; it also puts federal 
takings claimants into the unparalleled position of having to go 
through both a predeprivation and postdeprivation process to prose-
cute their claim.341 Nothing in Parratt requires this.342 In fact, if there is 
                                                                                                                      
335 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. 
336 Id. at 195 n.14; see also Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1202 n.6 (9th Cir. 
1984) (“Parratt . . . does not apply to cases in which the deprivation of property is effected 
pursuant to a state procedure and the government is therefore in a position to provide for 
predeprivation process.” (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. 517)). 
337 See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ( “[A] 
property loss compensable as a taking only results when the government intends to invade 
a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the ‘direct, natural, or probable 
result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inºicted by 
the action.’” (quoting Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870 
(1976))). 
338 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 308, at 13 n.7. 
339 See, e.g, Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541; LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. County of Lake, 579 F. Supp. 8, 
10–11 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (rejecting a postdeprivation remedy defense to government’s refusal 
to provide sewer service to prospective developers because of established policy excep-
tion). 
340 See, e.g., San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2496 (2005). 
341 See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. 
342 See generally id. 
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adequate predeprivation process, procedural due process doctrine is 
inapplicable.343
 If a property owner has a complaint after predeprivation process, 
it is one of a substantive nature.344 Parratt’s procedural due process, 
postdeprivation remedy is also inapplicable in this situation.345 Since 
takings claimants can and do receive predeprivation process, but al-
lege the loss of a property right despite such process, Parratt should 
be inapplicable to takings claims whether one looks at the just com-
pensation element through a procedural or substantive lens.346
2. The Court Didn’t “Understand This Case” and Wouldn’t Ask for 
Help 
 There is a simple, but startling explanation for the lack of any 
foundation for Williamson County’s state procedures requirement: the 
author of the opinion did not understand the dispositive issues at the 
time they were being decided and the Court signed onto the opinion 
without adequate brieªng.347 The revelation as to the late Justice 
Blackmun’s lack of understanding about the issues in Williamson County 
are found in his recently released Williamson County notes. In the mar-
gin of one paper, Justice Blackmun has inscribed in handwriting: “I am 
not sure I fully understand this case.”348 The notes further indicate that his 
confusion extended to the critical issue of the timing of a violation of 
the Just Compensation Clause.349 Justice Blackmun was apparently 
                                                                                                                      
343 See Lee v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 747 F.2d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 
1984) (dismissing procedural due process claim because of adequate predeprivation proc-
ess). 
344 See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 546; Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges that state action has violated an independent substantive right, 
he asserts that the action itself is unconstitutional. If so, his rights are violated no matter 
what process precedes, accompanies, or follows the unconstitutional action.”). 
345 Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Actions which vio-
late . . . speciªc substantive protections of the Bill of Rights lie outside the scope of Parratt 
because the constitutional violation is complete at the moment the action or deprivation 
occurs, rather than at the time the state fails to provide requisite procedural safeguards 
surrounding the action.”). 
346 See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541; Tomkins v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 566 F. Supp. 70, 77 (N.D. 
Ill. 1983) (holding Parratt inapplicable to a takings claim because plaintiff was asserting a 
“substantive constitutional guarantee: the right not to have her property seized with the 
active participation of the government and without just compensation.”). 
347 See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank 473 U.S. 172, 
194–95 (1985) (discussing state procedures requirement). 
348 Box 69, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 
349 Id. 
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struggling with the question of whether the Just Compensation Clause 
was violated either at the time of the taking, which would mean an ac-
tion accrued at that point, or after a court denies a claim for monetary 
damages—as Williamson County ultimately held.350
 Brieªng on the pertinent issues would have likely clariªed the 
critical issue for Justice Blackmun and the rest of the Court. However, 
in Williamson County, there was almost no brieªng by the parties on the 
merits of a state procedures requirement or the premises underlying 
the rule.351 The only question presented was whether the government 
“must pay money damages to a landowner whose property allegedly has 
been ‘taken’ temporarily by the application of government regula-
tions.”352 Given this question, the parties and amici curiae focused their 
brieªng almost entirely on whether the Constitution required damages 
for temporary regulatory takings.353 In the Williamson County opinion, 
the Court twice acknowledged that the parties’ brieªng extended only 
to the issue of compensation for temporary takings.354
 Only the Solicitor General of the United States argued that ripe-
ness barriers might defeat Hamilton Bank’s claim.355 Rightly believing 
that such issues were not before the Court, Hamilton Bank responded 
with a few sentences.356 In short, the Court concocted and adopted 
the state procedures ripeness requirement “out of the blue” without a 
full understanding of their correctness and without seeking or receiv-
ing adequate brieªng.357
                                                                                                                      
350 Id. 
351 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175, 185. 
352 Id. at 185. 
353 See id. at 174. The attorneys general of nineteen states and territories, together with 
the National Association of Counties, the City of New York, and the City of St. Petersburg, 
Florida joined the petitioner in urging the Court to reverse the judgment rendered in 
favor of the property owner “on the ground that a temporary regulatory interference with 
an investor’s proªt expectation does not constitute a ‘taking’ . . . or, alternatively, on the 
ground that even if [it] does . . . , the Just Compensation Clause does not require money 
damages as recompense.” Id. at 174–75. On the other side, four professional and public-
interest organizations ªled amicus curiae briefs urging the Court to afªrm the temporary 
takings judgment to establish that regulation which effectively wipes out a property’s value 
is a taking for public use, requiring money damages under the Just Compensation Clause. 
See id. at 174 n.*. 
354 Id. at 175, 185. 
355See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 308, at 1; Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (No. 84-4); Kanner, 
supra note 27, at 330. 
356 Kanner, supra note 27, at 327. 
357 Id. 
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 In any event, the state procedures portion of Williamson County 
was not even necessary to the result in that case.358 The Williamson 
County Court had already held that the property owners’ claim was 
unripe for lack of a ªnal decision; it could have decided the case on 
this basis alone.359 However, in what might be considered the most 
inºuential dicta in all of takings law, the Court posited that ripeness 
also required the ªling of a just compensation claim in state court.360 
The result was predictable: a constitutional rule—that federal claims 
for just compensation ripen by state court litigation—that lacks the 
authority of precedent or logic, that is at odds with other doctrines, 
such as preclusion and Rooker-Feldman, and which has accordingly 
generated a federal jurisdictional mess of titanic proportions.361 Now, 
thanks to San Remo IV, the irredeemably ºawed and unnecessary state 
procedures requirement has conspired with preclusion to make fed-
eral claims for just compensation federally homeless. 
3. Why the Silence? 
 What is particularly jarring about San Remo IV’s revolutionary out-
come is that the majority refused to expressly clarify its position on the 
nature or role of the state procedures requirement underlying that 
outcome.362 The majority never acknowledges or counters the concur-
rence’s criticism of the requirement.363 Indeed, the opinion never even 
directly states that Williamson County requires state court litigation or 
mentions that the state procedures requirement was crafted as a ripe-
ness rule.364 The majority breaks its silence on Williamson County only 
once, to clarify that a federal takings claim may be raised in state court 
as an initial matter without prior state court litigation.365 While this 
clariªes some confusion about what is allowed in a state court action, it 
does not address why the claimants are in state court to begin with and 
why they cannot go to federal court afterwards. 
 Why is the majority so reticent on these fundamental Williamson 
County questions? Given the extent to which its decision hinges on the 
operation of Williamson County, one expects some conªrmation or dis-
                                                                                                                      
358 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–95. 
359 See id. at 192–93. 
360 Id. at 194–95. 
361 See id. 
362 See generally San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
363 See id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
364 See generally id. 
365 Id. at 2506 (majority opinion). 
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cussion of that decision and is unsettled at its absence.366 The obvious 
and most plausible explanation for the silence is that the majority—or 
some of its members—considered Williamson County to be beyond the 
scope of the question presented.367 Indeed, the question presented by 
San Remo’s petition did not directly challenge Williamson County’s state 
procedures requirement.368 At oral argument, San Remo’s counsel re-
iterated that the hotel had not asked the Court to reconsider Williamson 
County, to which Justice O’Connor replied: “Maybe you should have.”369
 Nevertheless, the Court’s desire to stay within, or close to,370 the 
boundaries of the issue preclusion question is not a fully satisfying an-
swer to its silence on Williamson County because the majority could 
have discussed its understanding of the origin, parameters, and effects 
of the state procedures rule without actually deciding its correctness. 
This would have maintained ªdelity to the question presented and 
imbued the decision with more legitimacy. A more complete blackout 
on Williamson County makes sense only if one or more of the majority 
justices thought the state procedures ripeness requirement was incor-
rect, but also believed that the preclusion question at hand did not 
permit even a restrained discussion of that rule. A justice in this posi-
tion might logically seek to avoid any commentary that could be con-
strued as approving Williamson County, or as impliedly rejecting the 
concurrence’s views on the shortcomings of the case. Such a justice 
would accept the unavoidable afªrmative effects on Williamson County 
arising from enforcement of preclusion, as long they were wholly im-
                                                                                                                      
366 See id. See generally Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
367 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501 n.18 (“We did not grant certiorari on many of the 
issues discussed by the parties and amici.”); id. at 2510 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(“[N]o court below has addressed the correctness of Williamson County, neither party has 
asked us to reconsider it, and resolving the issue could not beneªt petitioners.”). 
368 See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194–97. With respect to preclusion, San Remo’s 
petition for certiorari asked whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by 
issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which 
was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings 
claim?” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 174, at i. 
369 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6: 3–7, San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (No. 04-340). 
370 The sole question on which the Court granted certiorari concerned the applicabil-
ity of issue preclusion to San Remo’s takings claims. See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501. But 
in deciding the case, the Court reframed the issue as “whether we should create an [Eng-
land-type] exception to the full faith and credit statute,” which includes issue and claim 
preclusion. Id. at 2500, 2501; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). Therefore, in answering its own 
question in the negative, the Court afªrmed both types of preclusion in the takings con-
text, and went beyond the scope of the question presented. 
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plicit and bereft of any supporting discussion that might make it more 
difªcult for a future court to overturn Williamson County.371
 However, if such a hypothetical majority justice does not exist—if 
all majority justices were satisªed with Williamson County—as the ma-
jority decision implies, then the majority’s refusal to discuss the state 
procedures requirement and its role in the San Remo IV result is truly 
troubling. In this case, the majority may be viewed as the judicial 
equivalent of a referee who hides the ball because he knows it won’t 
bounce. That is, one might easily conclude that the majority purpose-
fully ignored Williamson County and its ripeness aspect because to en-
gage these concepts is to recognize, as the concurrence did, that they 
are both doctrinally unsound and incapable of legitimately relegating 
takings claims to state court. If this is the case, then San Remo IV is the 
worst sort of result-oriented decisionmaking.372
C. Federal Takings Litigation After San Remo IV 
 Whatever its purpose, the majority’s silence on Williamson County 
leaves the state procedures requirement intact to the extent it requires 
takings claimants to seek just compensation in state court.373 Because 
the Court recognizes that federal just compensation claims can be im-
mediately raised in the mandated state court action, and because claim 
preclusion bars all claims that could have been raised in prior litigation, 
the denial of an England-type exception for takings claimants ensures 
that many will never have recourse in federal court.374
 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that San Remo IV 
closes the federal courthouse door to all federal takings claims. Wil-
liamson County arose from, and focuses on, a takings claim seeking the 
remedy of monetary compensation.375 In crafting the state proce-
                                                                                                                      
371 Of the justices in the majority, Justice Scalia seems the most likely candidate for the 
described role. The problem is that, at oral argument, Justice Scalia did not seem dis-
turbed by the possibility that state courts would serve as the exclusive forum for just com-
pensation claims provided the claimants could resort to the Supreme Court. See Transcript, 
supra note 369, at 24:21–25 (stating that it was “perfectly ªne” and not “strange” to leave “it 
to the State court to make these decisions,” but expressing concern that the claimants 
might be barred from the Supreme Court). 
372 This very charge has been leveled at Williamson County itself. See Kanner, supra note 
27, at 331 (“[O]ne . . . gets the unshakable impression that the Williamson County opinion 
was a manifestation of a syndrome known to appellate lawyers as ‘Have opinion; need 
case.’”). 
373 See supra text accompanying note 360. 
374 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2501–06. 
375 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 182–83. 
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dures rule, the Williamson County Court was concerned only with rip-
ening claims for just compensation: “if a State provides an adequate 
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot 
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation.”376 Therefore, when the 
Williamson County Court states that “The nature of the constitutional 
right . . . requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtain-
ing compensation,”377 the right the Court may be referring to is the 
right to monetary compensation. In First English, the Court stated that 
“one seeking compensation” must follow Williamson County’s state pro-
cedures requirement.378 Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the state procedures requirement applies only when the relief sought 
is compensatory.379 In San Remo IV, the majority expressly approved 
this reading in concluding that San Remo’s facial claims could be 
brought directly in federal court, avoiding preclusion, because they 
“requested relief distinct from the provision of ‘just compensation’ 
. . . .”380
 Under Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,381 takings claimants can no 
longer invoke the same facial noncompensation claims raised by San 
Remo IV for purposes of securing federal jurisdiction or otherwise.382 
Those claims related to whether the challenged regulation caused 
takings by failing to substantially advance a legitimate state interest,383 
and the Lingle Court rejected this substantial advancement test as a 
takings standard two weeks prior to San Remo IV. 384 Takings claimants, 
however, may seek noncompensatory relief under other takings theo-
ries and, in this way, secure direct federal review of their claims.385 
There is no reason to believe that such actions must arise from facial 
                                                                                                                      
376 Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
377 Id. at 195, n.13. 
378 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
312 n.6 (1987) (emphasis added). 
379 See, e.g., San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506 (noting that San Remo’s facial claims were 
ripe in federal court without compliance with the state procedures rule because those 
claims did not seek monetary compensation); First English, 482 U.S. at 312. 
380 San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506. 
381 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005). 
382 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506 n.25. 
383 See id. at 2506. For discussion of the history and scope of the substantially advances 
test, see R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation that Fails to Substantially Advance Le-
gitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 353 (2004). 
384 See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2085–86. 
385 See Abraham, supra note 3, at 125–26 (noting that the state procedures ripeness 
rule may not apply when a property owner seeks “damages or restoration of property “ 
rather than just compensation). 
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challenges. In noting that San Remo’s failure to substantially advance 
claims would have been cognizable in federal court, the San Remo IV 
Court focused on the nature of the relief requested, not their facial 
quality.386 Moreover, the Court has acknowledged that a declaratory 
relief action in an as-applied challenge is “no different in substance 
from a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute or zon-
ing ordinance—which we would assuredly not require to be brought 
in state courts.”387
 Claims for noncompensatory relief are most likely to be accepted 
where compensation cannot be practically provided,388 or where the 
taking is prospective.389 However, these circumstances might include 
relatively common exaction cases where the government proposes to 
take money or real property as a condition of a permit. When a prop-
erty restriction, “‘rather than burdening real or physical property, re-
quires a direct transfer of funds’” declaratory relief is a proper rem-
edy.390 Property owners challenging a monetary exaction may be able 
to seek declaratory relief and thus obtain a federal forum. 
 More generally, as long as a property owner challenges an exac-
tion prior to accepting the permit—prior to the taking—declaratory 
relief should be an available remedy, regardless of the character of the 
exaction. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the leading exac-
tion takings case, the plaintiffs sought391—and the Court provided—
the equivalent of declaratory relief in holding that permit conditions 
                                                                                                                      
386 See San Remo IV, 125 S. Ct. at 2506. 
387 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989) 
(citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977)). 
388 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520–22 (1998) (holding that injunctive and de-
claratory relief was available where monetary compensation was unavailable as a practical 
matter); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15 (1978) 
(stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act “allows individuals threatened with a taking to 
seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before po-
tentially uncompensable damages are sustained.”). 
389 See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, 75 USPQ.2d 
1025, 1037 (S.D. N.Y. 2005) (declaring that a contemplated future act would be a taking 
requiring just compensation, and that only the issue of compensatory damages was not 
ripe because the taking had not occurred). 
390 See, e.g., E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 
(2d Cir. 1995)). 
391 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The Nollans prosecuted their takings claim by ªling a petition 
for writ of administrative mandamus, which only provides invalidation as a remedy. See id. 
at 829. 
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affected a taking.392 Since such relief is “distinct from the provision of 
‘just compensation,’” exaction litigants may be able to sue in federal 
court after San Remo IV. 393 Even litigants with facial Penn Central or 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council claims may be able to secure 
federal jurisdiction by seeking declaratory relief.394 No Supreme 
Court precedent directly forecloses this proposal.395
 However, even if some takings claims make it into federal court 
under a noncompensatory relief exception or otherwise, the reality is 
that after San Remo IV, many as-applied claimants suffering the most 
severe restrictions on their property rights will not be able to seek the 
federal constitutional compensatory remedy in federal court. The 
Court did not have to leave these claimants in this position.396 Con-
fronted with Williamson County’s patent misconceptions and intent to 
ripen claims, the Court could have loosened the state procedures re-
quirement to put just compensation claims on equal footing with 
noncompensatory takings claims and other constitutional guarantees 
when it comes to the availability of a federal forum. For instance, the 
Court might have concluded that the San Remo Hotel plaintiffs mis-
interpreted the state procedures requirement to mandate state court 
procedures, when all it actually required was an administrative request 
                                                                                                                      
392 See id. at 841–42 (reversing the California courts’ denial of the writ of administrative 
mandamus and declaring “if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay 
for it.”). 
393 See 125 S. Ct. at 2506. 
394 Cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–17 (1987) (invalidating a statute requiring 
small parcels of inherited land to escheat to the government). See generally Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1978); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978). 
395 Although First English held that states must provide a compensatory remedy for 
regulatory takings that have occurred, it did not hold that plaintiffs are barred from seek-
ing other forms of relief. See First English, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). Monsanto held that 
plaintiffs raising takings claims against the United States must seek compensatory relief 
under the Tucker Act and therefore cannot sue for injunctive or declaratory relief, but 
said nothing about the propriety of non-compensatory takings claims against a local or 
state agency. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1016–19 (1984). Moreover, the Court has never 
rejected the concept that “regulation that goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking 
by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985) (“The remedy . . . under [this] theory, is not 
‘just compensation,’ but invalidation of the regulation, and if authorized and appropriate, 
actual damages.”). 
396 See Michael C. Dorf, The Case of the Half-Million Dollar Typo: The Supreme Court Traps 
Property Owners in a Catch-22, FindLaw Legal Commentary, June 22, 2005, http://writ. 
news.ªndlaw.com/dorf/20050622.html (“[H]aving fashioned the Williamson County re-
quirement in the ªrst place, the Court could also, if it so chose, weaken it . . . .”). 
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for compensation.397 Or, the Court may have found some other way to 
relax the state procedures rule.398 The majority, however, remained 
silent and implicitly converted the state procedures ripeness prerequi-
site into a permanent barrier to federal court review. 
 Thanks to San Remo IV and Williamson County, the Court has gone 
far toward making the Just Compensation Clause the ªrst provision to 
be effectively unincorporated from the Fourteenth Amendment. This is 
surely an ironic and ill-suited end for the ªrst constitutional provision 
to be enforced against the states.399 Even more disappointing than the 
abdication of a federal role in securing property rights against over-
zealous state action is the fact that it was accomplished by indirection. 
The Fifth Amendment deserves more respect.400
Conclusion 
 Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank was a mistake from the start. 
Although that decision said “go to state court ªrst, but if you lose, you 
are welcome in federal courts,” it did not explain how that rule inter-
acted with a federal preclusion doctrine that said “if you’ve been in 
state court, you must stay there.” Because Williamson County did not 
intend to preclude takings claims from federal court, the rigid appli-
cation of well-known preclusion rules to bar ripe takings claims seems 
unnecessary. The lower courts deserve credit for accepting the Eng-
land v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners reservation as a vehi-
cle for allowing takings claims to proceed in federal court after the 
state court litigation, as envisioned by Williamson County. The ªnal ex-
pression of that compromise in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste 
Management Service was a plausible and fair, even if inefªcient, way to 
                                                                                                                      
397 This possibility was suggested by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist at oral argument 
in San Remo IV. See Transcript, supra note 369, at 23:14–17 (“Do you think Williamson 
County by its terms spoke of going to State court and—rather than just a State administra-
tive proceeding?”). 
398 See Dorf, supra note 396. 
The Court might have weakened Williamson County by saying . . . [a] federal 
court defendant may demand that a plaintiff bringing an as-applied Takings 
Claim ªrst provide the state authorities with an opportunity to pay just com-
pensation. But a defendant who so demands thereby waives the ability to use 
the state court judgment later to preclude litigation of the federal issue in 
federal court. 
Id. 
399 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897). 
400 See generally Ely, supra note 242. 
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reconcile preclusion with Williamson County’s promise of eventual fed-
eral review for federal just compensation claimants. 
 In refusing to recognize an England-type exception to preclusion 
in the takings context, the San Remo IV Court elevated the Full Faith 
and Credit Act over Williamson County’s constitutionally-grounded 
ripeness promise that just compensation claims are proper in federal 
court after state court litigation. In effect, San Remo IV afªrmed the 
state procedures requirement as requiring completion of state court 
compensation procedures—and the unsupportable basis for that re-
quirement—while ignoring the fundamental ripening purpose of the 
rule. Therefore, despite the majority’s contrary assurances,401 San 
Remo IV is “radical” for both its result—divesting federal courts of 
their ability to hear just compensation claims arising under the Fifth 
Amendment—and for its refusal to address Williamson County or its 
ripeness premises. 
 San Remo IV may not have gone as far in closing off the federal 
forum as it may ªrst appear,402 but damage has been done. Federal 
just compensation claimants, unlike other constitutional litigants, have 
been reduced to lurking around the federal courthouse doors, hat in 
hand, hoping for some judge to take pity on them by accepting their 
declaratory relief claims or by ªnding state remedies inadequate.403 
They are in such straits not because of some legitimate constitutional 
anomaly, but mostly because the Court engaged in shoddy jurispru-
dence in Williamson County and then failed to summon the courage to 
                                                                                                                      
401 See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005) (“It is hardly a radical notion to recog-
nize that, as a practical matter, a signiªcant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate 
their federal takings claims in state courts.”). 
402 See supra notes 378–95 and accompanying text. 
403 As Professor Kanner has put it: 
 Judges would do well to understand that landowners seeking relief in their 
courts are not some sort of enemy, but rather their fellow American citizens 
invoking the protection of the Bill of Rights. They are entitled to better 
treatment than the back-of-the-hand dismissal of their vital interests that they 
have had to endure thus far in so many of these cases. If nothing else, they 
are entitled to be told plainly and as expeditiously as any other litigants 
whether they won or lost on the merits, without having to run a decade-long 
administrative and litigational obstacle course, menaced throughout by the 
likelihood that eventually, through a process of judicial nitpicking (in which 
with the beneªt of hindsight, little if anything seems to satisfy the judges), 
they may be told at the end that the run was for naught and they must start all 
over again. 
Kanner, supra note 27, at 352. 
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clean up its own mess in San Remo IV. 404 The Court has provided no 
acceptable justiªcation for maintaining this situation. Therefore, it 
should overturn Williamson County’s state procedures requirement at 
the ªrst opportunity. If it will not act, then Congress should amend 
the Full Faith and Credit Act to create an exception to the takings 
preclusion trap laid by Williamson County. 
                                                                                                                      
404 See supra Part IV.B. 
